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The college-high school wage diﬀerential in the US ﬂuctuated dramatically since the 1960s. It
declined in the 1970s, increased rapidly in the 1980s, and continued to rise in the 1990s, but
at a slower pace (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Katz and Autor, 1999; Card and Lemieux, 2001;
Autor et al., 2008). These movements are usually interpreted as reﬂecting changes in the prices of
college and high school skill, brought on by shifts in demand and supply. However, changes in the
composition of college and high school graduates resulting from an expansion in college enrollment
can be equally important. The decline in the college premium in the 1970s may reﬂect not only an
increase in the supply of college graduates, but also a decline in their average quality. Similarly,
the rise in the college premium in the 1980s and 1990s could have been even more pronounced if
the quality of college graduates was stable during these two decades.
In this paper we present a decomposition of the trends in college and age premia into price
and composition eﬀects. Prices are determined by the interaction of the demand for skill with
the quantity of skill supplied in the market, while composition is determined by the quality of
individuals in each schooling level. Throughout the paper, we equate shifts in average quality
of a particular cohort of college workers with shifts in the proportion of cohort-speciﬁc college
enrollment by region of birth, even though the former are unobserved.1
Our main empirical challenge is to separate changes in the supply of college labor from changes
in the quality of college graduates. The is diﬃcult because these two variables generally move
together. In order to break this link we start by assuming that all individuals in a given age group
working in the same regional labor market (in the same year) face the same skill prices, even if
they were born and schooled in diﬀerent regions. However, their wages diﬀer because they have
heterogeneous quantities of skill, which may be due to diﬀerences in composition across regions
of birth. Therefore, by comparing (within labor market) wages of individuals born in regions
with diﬀerent fractions of college enrollment (and therefore, with a diﬀerent average quality of
college participants), we are able to identify the eﬀect of quality on wages. We control for intrinsic
diﬀerences across regions of birth using region of birth dummies, which are allowed to vary with
year and with age.
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition behind our procedure. Using US Census data between 1960
1Therefore, for most of the paper we use the terms quality and composition interchangeably. In Section B.4, we
present direct evidence of the decline in the quality of college workers due to the increase in the proportion of college
enrollment.
1and 2000, we group individuals into year-age-region of birth-region of residence cells. For each
cell we compute the college premium, and we estimate the proportion of college participants for
each cohort and region of birth, and the proportion of college participants for each year, age and
region of residence.2 Each line in the ﬁgure (and associated set of points) represents the relationship
between the college premium in the region of residence and the proportion in college in the region of
birth (our measure of composition) for a diﬀerent set of labor markets. Labor markets are grouped
according to the proportion of college workers in the region of residence (which is meant to represent
supply). Within each set of similar labor markets (according to a supply indicator), there is a clear
negative relationship between the college premium in the region of residence and the proportion
in college in the region of birth, which is conﬁrmed by the regression line.3 Those workers with
the lowest college premium are the ones born in regions of birth (and cohorts) where the college
enrollment rate was the highest, and (presumably) the average quality of college students was the
lowest.
There are two competing interpretations of our ﬁndings. First, marginal college students are
of lower quality than average college students. When there is an expansion in college attendance
these marginal students are drawn into college, resulting in a decline in average quality. Second,
the rise in college attendance means that resources have to be spread more thinly across students,
resulting in a lower quality learning experience in college. We cannot separate the two, and leave
this important topic for future research.
Our empirical strategy is analogous to the one used by Card and Krueger (1992) to estimate
the eﬀect of school quality on labor market outcomes, although its use is new in the present
context. One concern with it is that selective migration may bias our estimates, as emphasized in
Heckman et al. (1996). We address this concern by implementing a series of corrective procedures
adapted from Heckman et al. (1996) and Dahl (2002). More importantly, we argue that selective
migration would bias our estimates if changes in selective migration were correlated with changes
in schooling (see section 5), and we present evidence that this is unlikely to drive our results. We
also show that our results are robust to the inclusion of measures of school quality.
2We consider white males aged 25-60 only, grouped into 5 year age groups. We consider 9 regions of residence and
9 regions of birth (Census regions). The college premium is the diﬀerence in average log wages of those with exactly
16 years of schooling and those with 12 years of schooling. The proportion of those in college is the proportion of
individuals with at least some college. The same age groups and Census regions are also used in our main empirical
work.
3Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the variance of the college premium in each cell. The slopes of all
three lines are negative and statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. We obtain a similar picture if, instead
of using the college premium as the dependent variable, we use average college wages in each cell.
2Much of the focus of the literature is on the college premium, but we devote similar attention
to the age premium since changes in this parameter are as large as those in the college premium.
We ﬁnd that the decline in the quality of college graduates between 1960 and 2000 lead to a
decrease of 6 percentage points in the college premium. Given that the college premium grew by
20 percentage points between over these 40 years, this quality eﬀect is substantial. Our analysis of
the age premium shows even more striking results. For college graduates, we can attribute much
of the ﬂuctuation in the age premium (its increase in the 1970s and its decline in the 1980s) to
movements in the quality of college graduates. In contrast, the importance of quality changes on
the average wage of high school graduates is negligible. The diﬀerential eﬀects of worker quality for
college and high school wages can be explained by a model with at least two types of ability, one
speciﬁc to high school, and one speciﬁc to college. This provides a better description of the labor
market than a single ability model (e.g., Willis and Rosen, 1979; Carneiro et al., 2009; Deschˆ enes,
2007), and constitutes the basis of our empirical framework.
Composition eﬀects of the type we discuss are often thought to be unimportant in the empirical
literature on the college premium, although their existence is well recognized.4 See Katz and Murphy
(1992), Juhn et al. (1993), Hoxby and Long (1999), Gosling et al. (2000), Galor and Moav (2000),
Acemoglu (2002), Juhn et al. (2005), Fortin (2006), among others. Very few empirical studies di-
rectly searched for composition eﬀects. For example, using the 1940-1990 US Census, Juhn et al.
(2005) found that increases in college enrollment led to a lower college premium through composi-
tion eﬀects, but their estimated eﬀects were quite small (the procedure we use is quite diﬀerent and
is likely to provide better variation for identiﬁcation of supply and quality eﬀects).5 Carneiro et al.
(2009) and Moﬃtt (2008) show that marginal returns to college fall as more individuals go to
college. Similarly, Carneiro and Lee (2009) estimate a selection model using data for the 1990s
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979 (using the standard instruments in the
literature for identiﬁcation), and show that a model compatible with the magnitude of selection
observed in that dataset implies the existence of large composition eﬀects.
Our paper is also related to the literature which tries to separate the role of the return to
schooling and return to ability in the evolution of college premium (Chay and Lee, 2000; Taber,
2001; Deschˆ enes, 2006), and to the empirical literature estimating returns to schooling purged of
4Our composition eﬀects are diﬀerent from those of Lemieux (2006), who studies the role of composition eﬀects
in terms of explaining the increase of the variance of unobserved skills over time.
5Rosembaum (2003) presents an alternative analysis reporting larger eﬀects.
3selection bias. Their ﬁnding that selection bias is substantial and it is changing over time (even
keeping composition ﬁxed), reinforces the importance of studying changes in composition. The
two problems are diﬀerent sides of the same coin: if one believes that standard estimates of the
college premium are biased because of self-selection (and one would like to correct the bias), then
changes in self-selection (due to changes in composition) are bound to produce movements in the
college premium. Indeed, the neglect of composition eﬀects distorts our assessment of the economic
drivers of inequality. In the last 40 years, changes in worker quality mask increases in the return
to schooling larger than the ones we observe in the raw data, by exacerbating the role of increases
in the supply and attenuating the role of increases in the demand for college workers.
Finally, our analysis has a close parallel with the study of selective unemployment and inequal-
ity. This literature shows that changes in unemployment rates dramatically change the evolution of
inequality due to composition eﬀects. See, for example, Keane et al. (1988), Blundell et al. (2003),
Chandra (2003), Heckman and Todd (2003), Neal (2004), Blundell et al. (2007), Mulligan and Rubinstein
(2008), Petrongolo and Olivetti (2008), among others.
A concern with our approach is that, as in most of the literature, we take changes in supply,
demand and composition as exogenous. This is a limitation of the analysis, on which we have
nothing new to add. Card and Lemieux (2001) suggest that cohort size may be an important
driver of the trend in college participation, while Fortin (2006) emphasizes also the role of tuition
policy at the state level. In a diﬀerent context, Acemoglu et al. (2004) consider the diﬀerential
extent of mobilization for World War II across U.S. states as a source of plausibly exogenous
variation in female labor supply.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our empirical strategy. This is followed by a
description of the data in Section 3. Section 4 presents estimation results and then Section 5 reports
a number of sensitivity checks. Section B.4 provides some direct evidence on the decline of college
workers. Section 7 shows quality-adjusted trends in the college and age premia. Section 8 revisits
the problem studied in Card and Lemieux (2001). Finally, we conclude in Section 9. Appendix A
describes our method for estimating the model. In addition, the online appendix provides a more
detailed description of data and some additional empirical results.
42 Econometric Framework
Section 2.1 presents a simple model of wage determination that allows for composition and price
eﬀects, together with a reduced form empirical strategy for distinguishing the two. Section 2.2
considers composition eﬀects and price determination in a standard model of the labor market
(Card and Lemieux, 2001).
2.1 A Simple Wage Structure
Each individual has schooling level S = k, where k = H,C (denoting high school and college).
There are separate labor markets for high school and college skills (e.g. Willis and Rosen, 1979;
Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985). Suppose that the wage of each individual i, of age a, at time t, who
is born and goes to school in region b,6 and works in region r (which may or may not be equal to
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This equation is the basis of our empirical models. It states that the average log wage of workers
in each (k,a,t,r,b) cell is equal to the sum of the log price of k-type skill for age group a in
6Hoxby and Long (1999) show that at least 75% of individuals attend university in their state of residence.
7We can extend this framework to allow for individual speciﬁc price shocks due, say, to shocks to match produc-
tivity (as long as they are uncorrelated with individual skill). The potential advantage of such an extension is that
it allows for changes in inequality even within (k,a,t,r,b) cells.
5labor market r at time t, and the average quality of workers in the corresponding cell. Therefore,
diﬀerences in the average log wages within each (k,a,t,r) cell among individuals from diﬀerent
regions of birth (b) reﬂect diﬀerences in quality across individuals from diﬀerent regions of birth.
We start by modelling πk
atr as ﬂexibly as possible, using full interactions between age, time
and region of residence dummies for each schooling group. Once schooling, age, time, and region
of residence are fully controlled for, the remaining variation in ωk
atrb must come from variation in
νk
atrb, allowing us to separate price and composition eﬀects.
Another advantage of this procedure is that, within labor market (t − a − r), diﬀerences in
schooling across cells (b) are not endogenous responses to unobserved diﬀerences in prices, since
prices are kept ﬁxed. The only source of variation in wages is variation in worker quality. The
drawback of this approach is that it does not allow us to understand the determinants of prices.
We come back to this in section 2.2.
We conjecture that νk
atrb varies over cells because of changes in the college participation rate.
For example, as more people go to college, the average ability of college-goers may fall. Thus, our
variable of interest is the proportion of college-goers in cohort t − a born in region b, denoted by
Pt−a,b.
There exist at least two possible distinct reasons for declining quality of average college workers.
First, individuals are heterogenous and marginal college entrants might be of lower quality than
average college attendees. For example, see Carneiro et al. (2009) and Moﬃtt (2008).8 Second, as
the proportion of individuals attending college increases, educational resources could be diluted,
resulting in diminishing quality of average college attendees of the cohort.9 These two interpreta-
tions have diﬀerent policy implications; however, empirically, we would not be able to distinguish
between them without further information about the production process in college. This is cer-
tainly an interesting and also challenging topic for future research, but in this paper, we focus on
quantifying the gross eﬀects of declining quality of college workers.
It is unlikely that Pt−a,b is the only important factor determining diﬀerences in the average
quality of workers across cells. Regions of birth diﬀer in several other dimensions besides the cost
of schooling. For example, school resources may vary across regions. Well endowed regions could
8To illustrate this idea, consider a simple economic model of college enrollment. Suppose that individuals enrol
in college if returns (β = Xγ +U) are larger than costs (C = Zη): S = 1 if Xγ −Zη+U > 0, where U is unobserved
ability that is independent of Z and X. It is possible to rewrite this model as: S = 1 if P (X,Z) > V , with P (X,Z) =
F−U (Xγ − Zη), V = F−U (−U), and F−U (.) is the c.d.f. of −U. Notice that E (β|X,S = 1) = Xγ+E (β|X,P > V ).
Changes in P result in changes in E (β|X,S = 1) due to composition eﬀects.
9We are grateful to an anonymous referee who emphasized this explanation as an important alternative.
6have higher quality schools, which simultaneously lead to higher worker quality (independently of
composition) and higher college enrollment. We account for this by using region of birth ﬁxed
eﬀects as additional explanatory variables. Furthermore, we allow region of birth to aﬀect both
time trends and age proﬁles by including (region of birth)×(time) interactions and (region of
birth)×(age) interactions. Finally, we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of direct
measures of K-12 school quality.
Moreover, migration across US regions is substantial (Groen, 2004; Bound et al., 2004), and it
is unlikely to be random (see, e.g., Heckman et al., 1996; Dahl, 2002). Individuals who migrate
may not carry with them the average quality of their region of birth. However, it could happen
that migrants are diﬀerent from non-migrants due to self selection, but the quality of both groups
changes with average college enrollment at the same rate, in which case our estimates would not
be aﬀected. This would imply that changes in selective migration are uncorrelated with changes
in schooling. In Section 5, we argue and present evidence that in our basic speciﬁcation (where we
include a rich set of dummies as controls), the correlation between changes in selective migration
and schooling is likely to be small, and unimportant for our results.
Still, we consider diﬀerent corrective procedures. One alternative is to condition on migration
probabilities as in Dahl (2002). Following Dahl (2002), one may estimate observed migration prob-
abilities and staying probabilities for each cell and add them as additional control variables. These
variables measure migration ﬂows across regions, which are likely to capture changes in relative
prices, and changes in the type of migrants. Another interpretation is that this procedure amounts
to estimating a selection model, although the exclusion restrictions are left implicit.10 A second
alternative is to account for (region of birth)×(region of residence) interactions corresponding to
(region of birth)×(region of residence) matches (Heckman et al., 1996). We apply both procedures,
allowing for (region of birth)×(region of residence) interactions to be time-varying.
None of these corrections has a strong impact on our estimates. In section 5 we present evidence
that changes in migration ﬂows (reﬂecting the quantity of migration) and migration premia (re-
ﬂecting the composition of migration) are uncorrelated with changes in schooling, which suggests
10Migration probabilities (computed as the proportion of individuals in each cohort, time period and region of
birth, who work in each region of residence r) have identifying variation because we exclude (cohort)×(region of
residence)×(region of birth) interactions from the wage equations (as in Dahl, 2002). This procedure is justiﬁed
if movements in migration probabilities are caused by changes in the cost of migrating (implicit in these omitted
interactions) which are independent of wages, or changes in the beneﬁts of migrating which are orthogonal to changes
in schooling because, say, they are unobserved at the time of the schooling decision (Meghir and Whitehouse (1994)
show that we can interpret our procedure as instrumenting migration probabilities with the omitted interactions).
Unfortunately we do not have in the Census variables that can serve as explicit exclusion restrictions.
7that selective migration is unlikely to be driving our results.
It is plausible to think that changes in selection into migration and changes in schooling are
uncorrelated, especially after accounting for all control variables (even though the levels of migration
and schooling are highly correlated in the cross section). The reason is that they respond to diﬀerent
prices (at diﬀerent points in time): while migration is driven by changes in relative prices, amenities,
and travelling costs across regions, schooling is mostly driven by changes in relative prices and costs
across schooling levels. Furthermore, much of the changes in prices are probably accounted for by
our procedure. If there is any remaining correlation, the direction of the bias can theoretically go
in diﬀerent directions.
In view of concerns raised above, we write νk
atrb (average quality of workers in a cell) as:
νk
atrb = γkab + γktrb + φk(Pt−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr), (4)
where γkab are region-of-birth ﬁxed eﬀects, interacted with age dummies and γktrb are region-of-birth
by region-of-residence ﬁxed eﬀects that are interacted with year dummies (capturing school quality
or other unobserved variations), φk is a function of Pt−a,b (capturing the eﬀect of composition), and
λk is a function of the proportion of individuals migrating from region r to region b (Pk
M,atrb, what
we call observed migration probability), and the proportion of individuals working in the same
region where they were born (Pk
M,atrr, what we call staying probability). Dahl (2002) proposed
the use of the observed migration probability to account for selection, reinterpreting Lee (1983)’s
idea that in the presence of multiple alternatives, what matters is only the ﬁrst-best choice (that
is, the observed choice among multiple alternatives). Dahl (2002) calls this assumption “the index
suﬃciency” and provides a detailed discussion of this assumption. Dahl (2002) also suggests that
staying probabilities should be used as additional controls since non-migrants can be substantially
diﬀerent from migrants.11
Putting equations (3) and (4) together, we can estimate our object of interest (φk(Pt−a,b)) from
the following regression:
ωk
atrb = γkatr + γkab + γktrb + φk(Pt−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr) (5)
where γkatr are full interactions of age-time-region ﬁxed eﬀects. The functions φk(.) and λk(.,.) are
11In the sensitivity analysis reported in Section 5, we check the robustness of our main results.
8speciﬁed in the empirical section. Throughout the paper, we call equation (5) the “reduced form”
model.
In summary, by comparing wages of individuals born in diﬀerent regions but working in the same
labor market we identify diﬀerences in worker quality. We can then relate these to diﬀerences in
college participation across regions of birth, to determine how increases in college attainment aﬀect
average worker quality. This identiﬁcation strategy is similar to the one used by Card and Krueger
(1992) to study the impact of school quality on wages. While Card and Krueger (1992) relate wages
with school quality variables, we relate them with the proportion of individuals going to college in
each region. As noted before, it is unlikely that we are capturing school quality eﬀects through our
variable because of the set of controls we use (e.g., region of birth interacted with year and age).
Furthermore, in the empirical section, we examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion of
direct measures of school quality.
2.2 Skill Prices in Equilibrium: Supply and Demand Framework
The model of the previous section allows us to obtain robust estimates of composition eﬀects, but
leaves the modelling of prices unspeciﬁed. In order to compare the role of composition with the
roles of supply and demand one needs a model for prices. We use the model in Card and Lemieux
(2001), extending it to account for composition eﬀects and regional labor markets.
2.2.1 Skill prices determination






are determined in equilibrium in a standard model of the
labor market. Suppose the aggregate output in period t, say Yt, is a sum of R regional outputs:




where Ytr is the aggregate output in region r and in period t, and R is the number of regions.
In addition, we assume that output in region r and in period t is a function of region-speciﬁc






9These two labor aggregates are in turn functions of sub-aggregates of age-group-speciﬁc high-school
and college labor, denoted by Lk
1tr,...,Lk













atr are (respectively) the number of workers and the average quality of those
workers with schooling k, in age group a, in year t, and in region r. There is imperfect substitution
between high school and college labor, and between workers of diﬀerent ages (Card and Lemieux,
2001). The existing literature on this topic implicitly assumes that Qk
atr does not change as the
supply of college graduates varies.
We assume that Qk

















atrb is the number of workers in sector k for age a in time t in region of residence r and
in region of birth place b and Uk





i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1
￿
, the average level of k-type skill for individuals with
schooling level k in age group a in year t in region of residence r and in region of birth b. This
equation says that, for each (k,a,t,r) cell, the average worker quality in region r can be written as
the weighted average of the quality of workers born in diﬀerent regions b, but working in region r.
The weights are the proportion of workers in r born in region b.
A standard assumption in the literature is that labor markers are competitive, implying that






































for each (k,a,t,r). By assumption, skill prices are speciﬁc to each (k,a,t,r) cell (which deﬁnes
a labor market), but common to all individuals in that cell regardless of their region of birth b
10(individuals born in diﬀerent regions are perfect substitutes).
2.2.2 Identiﬁcation of the structural model
In this section we discuss identiﬁcation of the parameters of the production function. There are
two main issues to consider, although they are fairly standard, so our discussion is brief. Recall
that, from the production function (for ﬁxed output prices) we can derive the implied demand for
each type of labor. It is useful to separate identiﬁcation of the relative demand for older vs. young
workers, and the relative demand for high school vs. college graduates.
We know that demand functions can be non-parametrically identiﬁed if i) the demand function
is stable and, ii) supply shifts are exogenous. Assumption ii) is very strong but it is standard in
this literature, and assumption i) is often found to be false. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992)
show that the college premium and the relative supply of college graduates trend upwards over
time, which means that the equilibrium cannot be moving along a stable demand curve. Therefore,
they conjecture that the demand for skill is trending upwards, due to skill biased technical change.
By analogy, it is natural to assume that the relative demand for older workers is not stable.12
The standard assumption (used throughout the paper) is that the demand for skill is stable up
to an additively separable trend. Still, knowing the direction of the trend is not suﬃcient for identi-
ﬁcation; one also needs to know the magnitude of the annual shifts. For example, Katz and Murphy
(1992) consider diﬀerent speciﬁcations, but the most popular one just has linear demand growth
(perhaps with a break in the 1990s, as in Autor et al., 2008).
Even if the demand function is non-parametrically identiﬁed, it is well known that eﬃciency
parameters and elasticities in (10) cannot be identiﬁed separately (see e.g. Diamond et al., 1978).
A standard practice in the literature is to allow for factor-augmenting (time-varying) technological
progress, while keeping the elasticity parameter ﬁxed over time. We follow this convention and
furthermore, as in Card and Lemieux (2001), we assume that both the production function, and


























where θktr is a factor-augmenting technology eﬃciency parameter for schooling group k in time
12Card and Lemieux (2001) assume away the existence of such trend in the experience premium, but not in the
college premium.
11period t in region r, σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) (with ρ ≤ 1) is the elasticity of substitution between college
and high school labor, βat is a factor-augmenting technology eﬃciency parameter for age group a
in time period t, αka’s are time-constant, age-relative eﬃciency parameters for schooling group k,
and σk ≡ 1/(1−ηk) (with ηk ≤ 1) is the elasticity of substitution between workers of diﬀerent ages
but with the same schooling k.
Let ξkat = logβat + ηk logαka and let
ξktr = (1 − ρ)logYtr + logθktr + (ρ − ηk)logLk
tr. (12)
From equations (10) and (11) it follows that, in equilibrium:
πk







where ξktr is the (year)×(region of residence) ﬁxed eﬀect (corresponding to the ﬁrst two terms
in the right hand side of equation (10)), and ξkat is the (possibly time-varying) age eﬀect for
each schooling group k = H,C. Equation (13) states that skill prices, πk
atr, can be expressed as a
separable function of a time varying region-of-residence eﬀect (ξktr), a time varying age eﬀect (ξkat),






). Skill prices can
change as quality (Qk
atr) varies, even if labor supply (Nk
atr) is kept ﬁxed. Therefore, composition
has a direct eﬀect on wages in each cell because it aﬀects the average quality of workers in the cell,
but it also has an indirect eﬀect through skill prices. We call equation (13) the “structural” model.
The construction of Nk
atr and Qk
atr are discussed below in the Data Section.
Putting (3), (4), (13) together with the model for Qk
atr developed in Appendix A we can estimate
ηk and φk (Pt−a,b) from the following structural model:
ωk







+γkab + γktb + φk(Pt−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr). (14)
Appendix A describes our method for estimating the structural model in detail (including a de-
scription of how Qk
atr is constructed).
It is useful to discuss restrictions imposed in our CES model and to compare them with those




12In contrast, the eﬃciency parameters for the age-by-schooling labor inputs are time invariant
parameters in Card and Lemieux (2001) (βat = βa for all t). However, allowing βat to have a
time-trend means that technological change can aﬀect the relative demand for older workers, as
well as the relative demand for college graduates (θktr). In the literature, skill-biased technological
change typically refers to changes in (θCtr/θHtr), although, in general, skills can be measured in
multiple dimensions. For example, the skill-biased technological change can manifest itself in terms
of changes in eﬃciency parameters for skills measured by age (increasing demand for experience).13
2.2.3 Two Alternative Speciﬁcations
There are several alternative ways to speciﬁcy equation (14). It is important to justify our choice
against two of them in particular. In section 5 we show that our results are robust to the use of
both of these alternative speciﬁcations.
First, one could think of deﬁning the labor market for each schooling level k by a − t − r − b
instead of a−t−r. This alternative model would relax the assumption that workers born in diﬀerent
regions deﬁned by b are perfect substitutes in each labor market deﬁned by r (they just have diﬀerent
amounts of eﬃciency units of skill). Instead, this model allows for imperfect substitutability. In
order to implement it we would deﬁne supply at the level of a − t− r − b instead of a − t− r, and
we could then run the following regression:
ωk
atrb = ξktr + ξkat + (ηk − 1)logNk
atrb +
+γkab + γktb + φk(Pt−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr). (15)
Even though imperfect substitutability is a more general assumption than the one we use, we
have good reasons not to estimate this model. One one end, the usual measure of supply in the liter-
ature on the college premium is the ratio of college to high school supplies (e.g., Katz and Murphy,
1992; Katz and Autor, 1999; Card and Lemieux, 2001; Autor et al., 2008). This is analogous but
not exactly equal to our measure of Pt−a,b, which we use instead for measuring composition. In
order to convince the reader that we are indeed able to separately identify supply and composition
the variables we use to measure each of them vary at very diﬀerent levels: supply varies at the level
of the a − t − r while composition varies at the level of the a − t − b.
13In our empirical results, it turns out that this departure from the model of Card and Lemieux (2001) has little
eﬀect on our estimates of composition eﬀects but it helps us with its overall ﬁt.
13Furthermore, our strategy for identifying composition eﬀects is robust to misspeciﬁcation of
the production function, as we can see from the reduced form model. We are able to identify
composition eﬀects keeping prices ﬁxed in a very ﬂexible way, which do not rely on imposing a
structure for the production function (apart from the assumption that individuals coming from
diﬀerent regions b are perfect substitutes within a given labor market r).
Second, notice that Qk
atr in equation (14) is a function of Pt−a,b, which can be seen from equation
(9). If we were very ﬂexible in the way we specify Qk
atr and φk(Pt−a,b) in equation (14), it would not
be possible to identify φk(Pt−a,b). Therefore, one may think of dropping Pt−a,b from the structural
model, estimating the following equation instead:14
ωk







+γkab + γktb + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr). (16)
One would think that we are able to include φk(Pt−a,b) together with Qk
atr in equation (14)
only because of the parametric structure we assume. Although that may be true, notice that it is
possible to separately identify these two components using a two step estimator. In the ﬁrst step
we would estimate φk(Pt−a,b) from the reduced form model which bypasses the speciﬁation of Qk
atr.
In the second step we would estimate the structural model after subtracting the role of composition
from wages:
ωk







+γkab + γktb + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr).
Therefore, we choose to estimate equation (14) as our baseline model, which explicitly preserves
the tight link between the reduced form and the structural models.
3 Data
We use data from the 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Censuses (1% sample).15 We focus on
white males, ages 25 to 60, and we aggregate them into 7 age groups: 25-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45,
14We would like to thank the editor for suggesting us this type of the alternative model.
15Our data was extracted from http://www.ipums.umn.edu/ (see Ruggles et al., 2004)
1446-50, 51-55, 56-60. We consider 9 regions of birth and 9 regions of residence,16 and we drop from
the sample those individuals who are foreign born. We group individuals into cells deﬁned by ﬁve
variables: schooling (high school or college), year, age group, region of residence, and region of
birth. The reason we do not use the state as the geographical unit is that the resulting cell sizes
would be too small for our estimates to be reliable.17
For each cell we compute the relevant average weekly log wages for full-time/full-year workers,
log total weeks worked (a measure of labor supply) and the proportion of individuals in college (a
measure of composition). Full-time/full-year workers are individuals who work at least 35 hours a
week and 40 weeks a year. In order to construct hours worked per week we use usual hours worked
in a week for the year of 1980, 1990 and 2000, and hours worked the week before the interview
for 1960 and 1970. We exclude farm workers from the group of full-time/full year workers. The
construction of wages and weeks worked described in this section is based on Card and Lemieux
(2001). Weekly wages for high school graduates are obtained by taking only white males with
exactly 12 years of schooling and dividing annual income from wages by annual weeks worked.
Weekly wages for college graduates are obtained in an analogous way, but considering individuals
with exactly 16 years of schooling.18 Unfortunately, for the 1960 and 1970 US Censuses weeks
worked are only available in intervals: 1 to 13, 24 to 26, 27 to 39, 40 to 47, 48 to 49, 50 to 52. For
these two years we take the midpoint of each interval as our estimate of weeks worked.
We now describe the construction of log weeks worked (Nk
atr) for high school and college equiv-
alents. Log weeks worked by high school equivalents are a weighted sum of weeks worked by white
males in each region of residence, who can be high school dropouts, high school graduates, and
individuals with some college. Log weeks worked by college equivalents are a weighted sum of weeks
worked by white males with some college, a college degree, or post-graduate studies.
The weights for these sums are deﬁned as follows. Each high school dropout week is only a
fraction of a regular high school graduate week. This fraction corresponds to the relative wage
16We use the regions deﬁned by the Census: New England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Vermont), Middle Atlantic (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania), East North Central (Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin), West North Central (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota), South Atlantic (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia), East South Central (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee), West
South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas), Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming), Paciﬁc (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington). Diﬀerent regions have
diﬀerent sizes, but we do not see this as a major problem for our analysis.
17Our attempts to do so resulted in imprecise estimates.
18Notice that in order to get measures of wages for clearly deﬁned and relatively homogeneous groups of individuals
we ignore high school dropouts, those with some college, those with post-graduate studies.
15of high school dropouts and high school graduates. Similarly, each week worked by an individual
with a post-graduate degree has a larger weight than a week worked by a college graduate, and
the weight is given by the relative wage of post-graduates and college graduates. Finally, in order
to construct the weights for some college weeks, we ﬁrst look at the diﬀerence between high school
graduate and college graduate wages. If the diﬀerence between some college wages and high school
graduate wages is say, one third of the diﬀerence between college and high school wages, then we
assign one third of some college weeks to high school, and two thirds to college. We allow these
weights to vary across age groups, but not across year or region.
We have one additional variable relative to those considered in Card and Lemieux (2001): com-
position. Composition is measured by (a function of) the proportion of individuals with some
college or more in each cell. This proportion should vary only with cohort and region of birth.
However, empirically it varies over time, even within cohort-region of birth cells, because individ-
uals acquire more education as they age (during their adult years), or because of (time varying)
sampling error or measurement error. Therefore, in order to get a measure of composition which
is ﬁxed within cohort and cohort-region of birth cell, we average this number across years using as
weights the proportion of people in each cell.
The quality-adjusted log weeks (logNk
atrQk
atr) can be constructed by the sum of log weeks worked
(logNk
atr) and log average quality (logQk
atr). The average quality of workers in (9) is not directly
observable and hence, it is necessary to develop a model for logQk
atr. In Appendix A, we provide
alternative models for logQk
atr. Our main model is based on the idea that the average quality of
workers in a regional labor market can be linked to some aggregate measure of the composition of
workers and also some aggregate measure of selective migration. See Appendix A for more details.
In order to have a clear idea of the sources of identiﬁcation in the model, it is helpful to
understand the level of variation of diﬀerent variables. Wages vary across schooling-year-age-region
of residence-region of birth cells (unrestricted variation). Weeks worked vary across schooling-year-
age-region of residence, and are constructed by adding weeks across regions of birth (therefore
they are constant across cells corresponding to diﬀerent regions of birth but the same region of
residence). Composition varies across cohort-region of birth (constant across regions of residence,
for the same region of birth). The deﬁnition of these variables conforms with the reasoning behind
our identiﬁcation strategy: skill prices are constant within region of residence and are aﬀected by
total labor supply in the region of residence, while composition is constant within region of birth
16(subject to assumptions on migration, which we further discuss in Sections 4 and 5).
In our setup, a migrant is an individual who resides in a region diﬀerent from the region he was
born in. Migration proportions are constructed simply by counting the number of individuals of
schooling group k, age a, year t, born in b and residing in r, and dividing by the total number of
individuals of schooling group k, age a, year t, born in b, independently of their region of residence.
Figure 2 shows the basic features of our data, which we present after grouping the nine Census
regions into four more aggregate regions: Northeast (New England + Middle Atlantic), North
Central (East North Central + West North Central), South (South Atlantic + East South Central
+ West South Central), and West (Mountain + Paciﬁc). The ﬁrst panel shows that the trend in
the college premium, measured by the average diﬀerence in log wages of college and high school
graduates, is qualitatively similar across regions, although there are diﬀerences in the levels. The
college premium rises in the 1960s, declines in the 1970s, accelerates in the 1980s and continues
growing in the 1990s but at a slower rate, except in the Northeast where the growth in the college
premium in the 1990s is comparable to that in the 1980s.
The college age premium (shown in the second panel), measured by the diﬀerence in average
log wages of 51-55 and 31-35 year old college graduates, increases in the 1970s in all regions, and
declines in the 1990s in all regions. It is stable during the 1980s in the northern regions, but it
declines during this decade both in the South and in the West. The high school age premium (shown
in the third panel) increases throughout the 1970s and 1980s for all regions, and then it seems to
stagnate or decline slightly. Notice also that the movements in the age premium we document are
of the same magnitude as the movements in the college premium. Between 1960 and 2000, the
college premium increased by 17% in our data, while the 5, 10 and 20 year age premia (relative to
the 31-35 year old age group) grew respectively by 7%, 7% and 6% among college graduates, and
6%, 8%, and 17% among high school graduates.
Finally, the last panel of the ﬁgure shows the evolution of the proportion of college attendees
in each region. Even though there are clear regional diﬀerences in the levels of this variable, with
the South presenting lower numbers than the other three regions, the trends are the same across
the US: college enrollment increases over time, but it grows at a lower rate starting in the 1980s.
These basic trends are well documented in the literature. It is interesting to see that there are
strong commonalities across diﬀerent regions.
174 Empirical Results
Table 1 reports estimation results that are obtained by implementing the econometric framework
described in Section 2. All regressions in the table are weighted by the inverse of the sampling
variance of average log wages in each cell and robust standard errors are reported in brackets,
clustered by schooling, region of residence, and year.
In column (1) of Table 1, we estimate the reduced-form model of equation (5). In this model
πk
atr is not modeled explicitly. Instead, we control for skill prices using full interactions between
year, age and region of residence dummies in separate regressions for college and high school. In
doing so, we estimate the role of composition by putting as little structure as possible on price
determination. In the empirical implementation of (5), we assume that φk is linear in the odds of
proportion in college ( ˜ Pt−a,b := Pt−a,b/(1 − Pt−a,b)). This functional-form choice is arbitrary, but it
gives a convenient parameterization (it is a strictly increasing function of Pt−a,b and can vary from
0 to ∞).19 In addition, λk in (5) is modeled as a second-order expansion of migration probabilities:
that is, linear and quadratic terms of Pk
M,atrb and Pk
M,atrr and the interaction between the two. All
regressions include region of birth dummies interacted with year and age, separately.20
Column (1) of Table 1 shows that the coeﬃcient on ˜ Pt−a,b is signiﬁcantly negative and quanti-
tatively large for the college equation, but insigniﬁcantly negative and quantitatively small for the
high school equation.21 This means that, for ﬁxed prices, log college wages respond substantially
to changes in college enrollment, but that is not the case with log high school wages. We estimate
that when the proportion of college participants increases from 50% to 60% ( ˜ Pt−a,b increases from
1 to 1.5) average college wages decline by 4.3%. We interpret this as a decline in average worker
quality.
Composition plays a much smaller role in the high school sector than in the college sector.
This is an interesting result which may happen for several reasons. For example, the skills that
determine selection into college may be less valued in high school type occupations than in college
type occupations. This is possible in a model of the labor market in which there are two or more
19We carried out estimation of the reduced-form model of equation (5) using alternative speciﬁcations of φk. The
main qualitative results of the paper are similar regardless of the speciﬁcation of φk. See the online appendix for
details.
20Therefore, we control for region of birth speciﬁc cohort trends, as well as time-varying region-of-birth by region-
of-residence eﬀects. Recall that these dummies were denoted by γkab and γktrb in (5).
21In the online appendix, we show that the main results are basically unchanged even when we include measures of
within group composition (the within odds of proportion in dropout, the within odds of proportion in some college,
and the odds of proportion in post college enrollment).
18types of skills, as opposed to a model with a single type of skill. Individuals are diﬀerentiated in
terms of a college skill and select on this skill when enrolling in college, but this is a skill that is
not valued in high school occupations.
Alternatively, in a model where the quality of college workers declines not because of an inﬂux
of lower quality workers, but because of a potential decrease in available educational resources per
capita in college (but not in high school), this is precisely what we would expect.22 The cohort
crowding hypothesis implies that a quality decline should only be visible among college workers,
and not among high school workers.
From Table 1 we can also infer the role of composition for the trend in the college premium, one
of the main goals of our paper. Since the college premium at time t is deﬁned as E
￿
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, this requires subtracting the college and high school wage equations and averaging
across all ages, regions of birth and regions of residence. Given that our speciﬁcation of the
high school and college wage equations is linear in all variables, in order to compute the eﬀect of
composition on the college premium we just need to take the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients on
˜ Pt−a,b in the college and high school equations. In column (1) of Table 1, this diﬀerence is equal to
-0.054, implying that the college premium would decline by 2.7% if college enrollment went from
50% to 60%.23 Our estimate also implies that an increase of college enrollment from 30% to 60%
(the magnitude similar to that observed between 1960 and 2000) leads to about a 6% decline of
college premium. One important implication of our ﬁndings is that estimates of the trend in the
college premium are contaminated by composition eﬀects, an issue we explore in Section 7.
In column (2) of Table 1, we estimate the structural model where πk
atr is modeled explicitly as
in (14). For comparison, in column (3) of Table 1, we estimate a model without logQk
atr in (13).
This corresponds to the standard model in the literature where we ignore changes in the quality
of workers and interpret ﬂuctuations in wages as being driven exclusively by changes in prices. In
both columns (2) and (3) of Table 1, the age eﬀect ξkat is modeled as an interaction of a linear
time trend with age speciﬁc dummies that are common between schooling groups.24 The exact
speciﬁcations of columns (2) and (3) are described in Appendix A.
In column (2), we can see that the coeﬃcients on ˜ Pt−a,b in the college and high school equations
22This was pointed out to us by a referee.
23In the online appendix, we report the eﬀects of declining quality of marginal college graduates on their average
log wages for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model, and at diﬀerent levels of P.
24We have chosen this speciﬁcation instead of a more ﬂexible one because we are concerned about overparameter-
ization of the model and also unrestricted interactions between age and time dummies for each schooling group lead
to imprecise coeﬃcients in quality-adjusted and unadjusted log weeks in columns (2) and (3), respectively.
19are not very diﬀerent from those in the more general model of column (1). Speciﬁcally, in column
(2), the diﬀerence between two coeﬃcients is −0.069, which is similar to −0.054 in column (1).
Thus, our estimation results are robust to alternative models for πk
atr. In the college equation, the
coeﬃcient for the quality-adjusted log weeks (ηC−1) in (13) is -0.11, which implies that the elasticity
of substitution between workers of diﬀerent ages in college is σC = 1/(1 − ηC) = 1/0.11 ≈ 9.1.
In the high school equation, the corresponding coeﬃcient (ηH − 1) is −0.09 and, therefore, the
elasticity of substitution is about 11.1. Thus, our estimates indicate that diﬀerent age groups are
slightly closer substitutes in high school than in college (equivalently, high school wages are slightly
less sensitive to labor supply than college wages). However, their diﬀerence is not statistically
signiﬁcant at any conventional level.
Looking at column (3), we see that the coeﬃcients for (quality-unadjusted) log wages in college
and high school are −0.188 and −0.090, respectively, implying that the elasticities of substitution
are about 5.3 and 11.1 in college and high school, respectively. Hence, failing to adjust for changes
in the quality of labor supply has a substantial eﬀect on our estimate of the elasticity of substitution
across age groups in college (σC). Movements in the number of weeks worked by college graduates
confound changes in the supply of college labor and changes in the composition of college labor.
The two eﬀects go in the same direction, and therefore the estimate of the eﬀect of college labor on
college wages is upward biased (in absolute value) if quality is not controlled for. However, there is
no diﬀerence between the two estimates in the high school equation, which is not surprising since
the composition eﬀect is not important in high school.
Our estimates in column (3) are of comparable magnitude (especially in the college equation) to
the estimates in Card and Lemieux (2001, Column (1) of Table VII), where the preferred estimates
are -0.201 for high school and -0.204 for college. What is remarkable is that after correcting for
the role of composition the college estimate drops dramatically to -0.11, which means that the
elasticity of substitution across age groups increases dramatically once we account for quality. We
come back to this point in section 8.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
We start this section by discussing two alternative speciﬁcations of the structural model, shown
above in equations (15) and (16). In the model of equation (15) we consider a labor market for each
(k,a,t,r,b) cell and to take Nk
atrb as supply and Pt−a,b as a measure of composition (or quality).
20Column (2) of Table 2 provides the corresponding estimation results. It can be seen that the results
are qualitatively similar to those in column (1), which are our baseline structural results in column
(2) of Table 1.
In addition, we consider an alternative structural model without the composition term φk(Pt−a,b),
as in equation (16). Column (3) Table 2 shows estimation results when φk(Pt−a,b) is dropped from
column (1). It is interesting to note that there is almost no change in estimates. This suggests that
Nk
atrQk
atr and φk(Pt−a,b) are at most very weakly correlated, given other control variables. This is
a bit surprising, and probably due to the fact that Qk






φk(Pt−a,b) does not weight Pt−a,b by any quantity.
Since the main focus of our paper is the magnitude of composition eﬀects and they can be
estimated from the reduced form model, we focus the remaining of our sensitivity analysis on the
reduced form model.25 Table A-17 presents estimation results for the college wage equation with
alternative speciﬁcations and samples. Comparable results for the high school wage equation are
not shown here but given in the online appendix, since there is no composition eﬀect for high school
graduates across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
We do not know what should be the correct functional form for φk(Pt−a,b) in equation (5).
Therefore, in the ﬁrst panel of Table A-17 we experiment with four alternatives. The ﬁrst column















and we report ψ1, ψ2, and the p-value of the test of joint signiﬁcance of these two parameters. In
the third column,
φk(Pt−a,b) = ψPt−a,b,
and in the fourth column,
φk(Pt−a,b) = ψ1Pt−a,b + ψ2P2
t−a,b.




21The ﬁrst panel of the table corresponds to the original sample of white males, and show that we
ﬁnd strong eﬀects of composition for alternative speciﬁcations of φk(Pt−a,b).26
In the remaining panels of this table we show the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent samples.
The middle panel corresponds to a sample of white females. The main reason why we chose to
focus on males rather than females was that female non-employment rates in our sample are,
on average, three to four times higher than male non-employment rates. If that is the case,
we need to worry not only about shifts in the composition of schooling, but also shifts in the
composition of employment (Blundell et al., 2003; Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008). There is no
signiﬁcant result here, suggesting that further research is needed to distinguish changes in the
composition of schooling from the changes in the composition of employment. In the bottom
panel, we group males and females together in the same sample. Results are similar to the original
ones, especially in column 3.
One purpose of this section is also to study the potential confounding role of selective migration
and school quality in our empirical work. If migration is selective then migrants may not carry with
them the average quality of their region of birth. Recall that our reduced form model includes:
year×age×region of residence, year×region of birth, and age×region of birth (on top of migration
ﬂows, which we ignore for now). Therefore, our estimates would be biased if, within region of birth,
cohort changes in selective migration are correlated with cohort changes in composition. In theory
this is a possibility, but the question is whether it is empirically important.
In our search for valid correction criteria, we studied this question in detail. Based on three
diﬀerent sets of results that will be discussed below, we conclude that it is unlikely that selective
migration explains our ﬁndings. Without a valid model for migration (identiﬁed with a valid
instrument) this is an untestable proposition, and therefore each of these results on its own is
merely suggestive of our claim. However, taken together, they provide a strong case for it.
First, we show that the inclusion of alternative sets of controls for selective migration does
not aﬀect our basic results. The reason is not that these variables do not aﬀect wages, but that
these variables (given the set of controls) are uncorrelated with changes in schooling. Table 4
26In addition, our quantitative results are robust to the use of an alternative measure of composition. In particular,
the coeﬃcient for Pt−a,b for the college wage equation (column (3) in the top panel of Table A-17) is -0.517. The
corresponding coeﬃcient for the high school equation is -0.295 (the full table is available in the online appendix).
This implies that if we use the level of proportion in college rather than the odds of proportion in college, the college
premium would decline by 2.2% if college enrollment increases by 10% (0.10 ∗ [−0.517 − (−0.295)] = 0.0222). This
change is comparable to 2.7%, which we obtained using the odds of proportion in college when college enrollment
changed from 50% to 60%.
22summarizes these results. In this table, we experiment alternative speciﬁcations for column (1) of
Table 1, where prices are modeled as full interactions between year, age and region of residence
dummies (reduced form model). Column (1) of Table 4 considers the simplest speciﬁcation, where
we add as controls region of birth interacted with year and age, to account for omitted variable
bias caused by heterogeneity across regions of birth. This is the base speciﬁcation in this table,
against which it is useful to compare the remaining columns. Column (2) expands the set of region
of birth eﬀects by adding a region of birth speciﬁc nonlinear cohort eﬀect.27 This amounts to
including a quadratic “cohort trend” in the model, as a parametric way of accounting for region of
birth speciﬁc cohort eﬀects that evolve smoothly across cohorts (for example, trends in local labor
markets aﬀecting the decision to migrate of individuals in diﬀerent cohorts). The resulting change
in the coeﬃcients of interest both in high school and college is quite small.
In Column (3) we attempt to control for selective migration more explicitly by including region
of residence and region of birth interactions, and allowing them to vary with year. With these
variables we intend to capture match speciﬁc shocks that can be time varying, and changes in the
quality of (region of birth)-(region of residence) migrants over time. Relative to Column (1), there
is a decline in the coeﬃcient of interest in college but again it is small, and almost no change in
high school.
Relatively to Column (1), in column (4), we add a basic set of migration probabilities, as
discussed above. In particular, for each (k,a,t,r,b) cell we include the proportion of individuals
born in r and residing in r (staying probability), the proportion born in b and residing in r (observed
migration probability), their squares and an interaction between the two (Dahl, 2002). What is most
striking about this column is that the results are similar to Column (1), although the coeﬃcients on
the migration proportion are highly signiﬁcant (jointly). This suggests that changes in migration
ﬂows are uncorrelated with changes in schooling in our basic speciﬁcation, an issue we explore
below.
Column (5) is the main speciﬁcation of the paper (and replicates Column (1) of table 1). In
Column (5) we join the speciﬁcations in (3) and (4). The remaining columns present variants of
these ﬁrst ﬁve speciﬁcations. In column (6) we take the speciﬁcation in column (4) but estimate it
only for migrant cells (cells for whom b 6= r). This column shows that our results are not driven by
diﬀerences between migrant and non-migrant cells. Instead, they seem to be driven by variation in
27A linear cohort eﬀect, (Cohort)×(Region of Birth), is implicitly included since (Cohort) = (Year) - (Age).
23composition across migrant cells.
Finally, in column (7), we add school quality variables as additional controls compared to the
basic speciﬁcation. The included school quality variables are pupil-teacher ratio, average term
length, and relative teacher salary, as in Card and Krueger (1992) and Heckman et al. (1996).28
One concern with the basic speciﬁcation in column (5) is that we may be capturing school quality
eﬀects through the proportion in college. It can be seen that diﬀerences between estimates in
columns (5) and (7) are small, indicating that our results are robust to inclusion of school quality
variables. We conjecture that this is because variation in school quality is already accounted for by
the set of controls we use in the basic speciﬁcation (region of birth interacted with year and age).
Our second set of results builds on the comparison between Columns (1) and (4) (and (5))
above, which show that the inclusion or exclusion of migration ﬂows as control variables does
not change our main results. This means that changes in migration ﬂows and changes in schooling
across cohorts are orthogonal. Therefore, it is unlikely that selective migration varies with schooling
because migration ﬂows (as opposed to schooling ﬂows) are roughly constant over time, although
the composition of migrants could still be correlated with schooling. We explore these two issues
more formally next.
In Table 5, we examine diﬀerences between including and excluding migration probabilities in
our basic speciﬁcation. In column (1), we reproduce estimates for the college sector from column
(4) of Table 4, but we present coeﬃcients for the migration probabilities as well. In column (2),
we show the estimate of odds in proportion in college without controlling for selective migration
(hence, this is the same as the speciﬁcation in column (1) of Table 4). In column (3), we show
the estimates for migration probabilities without controlling for proportion in college. In columns
(4)-(6), we show corresponding estimates for the high school sector. The coeﬃcients for proportion
in college are almost identical whether or not migration probabilities are controlled for. Similarly,
coeﬃcients for migration probabilities change only a little if we do not control for proportion in
college. This conﬁrms our assertion that migration ﬂows are orthogonal to changes in schooling.
In order to examine this more directly, in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, we regress the
proportion of individuals not migrating in each cell on the odds of proportion in college. We use
only non-migrant cells. In column (1), no control variable is used and in column (2), (Year)×(Age),
28Petra Todd kindly provided us with these variables for several states and years. For each individual in the Census,
we gathered the values of each school quality variable for the state he was born in, and for the years in which he
was between 6 and 17 years of age, and we averaged them. We assigned this as the level of school quality for each
individual in the data, and then we averaged these values within each (k,a,t,b) cell.
24(Year)×(Region of Birth), and (Age)×(Region of Birth) dummies are controlled for (as in our base
speciﬁcation). There is no signiﬁcant correlation between schooling and migration ﬂows in college.
The regression coeﬃcient in high school is signiﬁcant even after including the full set of controls,
but its magnitude is very small. Similarly, in columns (3) and (4), we use only migrant cells to test
whether the odds in proportion in college is correlated with the observed migration probability.
In column (3), no variable is controlled for and in column (4), the basic set of control variables is
used. Once again, after including the full set of controls, there is no evidence of any correlation
between migration ﬂows and college attainment. In columns (1)-(4), all regressions are weighted
by the inverse of the sampling variance of the dependent variable using the fact that the dependent
variable is a probability in each column.
These results show that migration ﬂows respond very little to schooling, which means that
selective migration is unlikely to vary with schooling. However, it is possible that the composition
of migrants is correlated with variation in schooling, even if the size of the migration ﬂows is not.
If this were true, we might expect changes in the raw migration premium (the average diﬀerence
between logs wages for migrants and those for stayers) to be correlated with changes in college
attainment, since this parameter will be sensitive to changes in the composition of migrants. In
order to check this possibility, in columns (5)-(7), we regress the migration premium on the odds
of proportion in college. In these columns, all regressions are weighted by the same weights used
in Table 1. In column (5) when no variable is controlled for, there is a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of
college attainment on the migration premium; however, this eﬀect disappears in columns (6) and
(7) when we introduce our basic set of controls. Therefore it is unlikely that changes in schooling
are correlated with changes in the composition of migrants.
Selective migration is undoubtedly important and may be present in our data even after includ-
ing our set of controls. However, we believe that, taken together, the results of Tables 4, 5, and 6
provide convincing evidence that selective migration does not substantially aﬀect our results.
In the online appendix we present additional speciﬁcation checks (unrelated to migration). First,
we examine how results change when we drop one of the nine regions at a time from the sample, to
check whether results are driven by one region alone as opposed to being a national phenomenon.
Second, we examine the sensitivity of our results to dropping one year at a time. Third, since
we aggregate individuals into two levels of schooling only, one may worry that changes in college
attainment also lead to changes in composition within each of these aggregates (between dropouts
25and high school graduates, those with some college and college graduates, or those between college
graduates and post-college-educated workers). We show that our basic results are unchanged even
when we include measures of within group composition (the odds of proportion in dropout within
the high school sector, the odds of proportion in some college within the college sector, and the
odds of proportion in post college enrollment).29
6 Direct Evidence on Declining Quality of College Workers
In this section we study the relationship between cognitive test scores of college attendees and the
proportion attending college across regions of the US.
We ﬁrst examine average scores on the SAT by state. As illustrated in Figure 3, test taking rates
vary widely across states, and states with a large proportion of SAT takers have low average test
results, because they test more students from the bottom of the distribution of student quality.
For example, in 2004 New York had the sixth lowest average verbal SAT score (497) and the
highest proportion of high school graduates taking the SAT (92%), while North Dakota had the
ﬁfth highest verbal score (590) and the lowest SAT test taking rate in the US (4%). Figure 3 does
not control for other possible confounding factors. For example, some states use mainly the SAT,
whereas other states use mainly the ACT. To carry out a more formal analysis, we have collected
average verbal and math SAT scores for high school seniors graduating in each state from 1993
to 2004. Our main explanatory variable is the proportion of high school seniors taking the SAT
in each state and year (as opposed to the proportion of college graduates among those graduating
from high school, since we observe SAT scores for those taking the SAT, regardless of whether
they attend college or not). For the years we are analyzing, the proportion of SAT takers is very
strongly correlated with the fraction of high school graduates graduating from four year colleges,
but not as much correlated with the fraction graduating from two year college (perhaps because
the SAT is needed for enrollment in four but not two year colleges).
Using this dataset, we run a regression of SAT math and verbal test scores on the percentage of
high school seniors taking the test. Our speciﬁcation is quite demanding, since we control for both
year and state dummies. The estimation results reported in Table 7 show exactly the same pattern
reported in ﬁgure 3. We ﬁnd that an increase in the proportion of high school seniors taking the
29One way to interpret these results is as saying that the most important margin for the phenomenon studied here
is the college enrolment margin, and not the college graduation margin.
26SAT is signiﬁcantly associated with lower math and verbal scores. This provides additional direct
evidence that increases in college attainment lead to declines in the quality of college attendees.
Second, we consider the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), which is a literacy survey
administered in several OECD countries. The US sample consists of a random sample of adults
aged 16-65 surveyed in 1994-1995. Three literacy tests were administered: Quantitative, Document
and Prose. The survey also collects data on individual schooling attainment, among many other
variables (see OECD, 2000). We restrict our analysis to the quantitative score of individuals aged
25-60 (our results are not sensitive to the test we use). We standardize the score so that it has
mean 0 and variance 1. The quantitative test measures individual proﬁciency in basic quantitative
tasks: “the knowledge and skills required to apply arithmetic operations, either alone or sequen-
tially, to numbers embedded in printed materials, such as balancing a checkbook, calculating a tip,
completing an order form, or determining the amount of interest on a loan from an advertisement”.
For each cohort, we group individuals into two schooling groups: high school or less, and some
college or more. Then for each cohort, we compute the percentage of individuals with some college
or above, which we call P. Table 8 reports the coeﬃcients of a regression of quantitative literacy on
age, age squared and P, for the high school and college groups separately, and for the whole sample
together. The coeﬃcient on P is negative and strong for college, and insigniﬁcant for high school.
The third column of Table 8 shows what happens when we run the regression for the whole sample,
including an indicator for college attendance (because college attendance may aﬀect literacy). The
coeﬃcient on P is zero, indicating that there are no intrinsic diﬀerences in the ability distribution
across cohorts, except diﬀerences in composition.30
The online appendix provides additional direct evidence on declining quality of college work-
ers by analyzing data from the original cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Males (NLS66), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979 (NLSY79), and the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1997 (NLSY97). In short, we have used data from the NLS66,
NLSY79, NLSY97, SAT, and IALS to show that empirical results from several diﬀerent sources are
all consistent with our main hypothesis.
30In order to explore further this issue, we estimated the quantiles of literacy conditional on age and age squared,
and a third order polynomial in P. We ﬁnd that the decline in literacy is mainly at the bottom of the college
distribution.
277 Quality-Adjusted Trends in the College and Age Premia
In this section, we construct quality-adjusted trends in the college and age premia. In order to do
so, for each year we need to construct average college and age premia across age, region of birth
and region of residence cells. We deﬁne the college premium, denoted by CPt, as the diﬀerence
between average log college and high school wages. A particular age premium for each schooling
k, denoted by APk
t , is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between average log wages of old workers and those













































where o and y denotes old and young workers, respectively, and fk
t (a,r,b) is the proportion of
individuals in cell (a,r,b) for each schooling group k and time t. There does not exist a natural
deﬁnition of young and old workers. In our empirical work, we set young workers to be those in
age group 25-30 and consider three diﬀerent age premia using age groups, 36-40, 46-50, and 56-60
as old workers.
In order to deﬁne quality-adjusted college and age premia, recall that average log wages for
each cell are modeled as:
ωk
atrb = πk
atr + γkab + γktb + φk(Pt−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr). (18)





atr + γkab + γktb + φk(P1960−a,b) + λk(Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr). (19)























































atrb corresponds to the average wage that we would observe in each cell if the average
worker quality was kept ﬁxed at its 1960 level. Variation in ω
k,Q
atrb over time is purely due to changes
in prices, which are caused by ﬂuctuations in the demand and supply of skill. ω
k,Q
atrb is an abstract
construction since it is impossible to vary the supply of labor without changing its composition,
unless selection into schooling is random.
Notice that the level of ω
k,Q
atrb is still aﬀected by selection. This happens because we ﬁx quality
of type k at the level of the average worker who self-selected into schooling level k in 1960 (thus,








a1960rb). In this paper we do not intend to estimate measures of ωk
atrb, and of the
college and age premia, purged of selection. Our more modest goal is to keep selection ﬁxed, so
that we can interpret movements in wages as reﬂecting solely movements in prices. The reason
why we do not try to purge the level ωk
atrb completely from selection is that we do not have enough
variation in Pt−a,b, which would have to have support over the entire unit interval in our data
for the selection correction to work. If that were the case we would be able to observe groups of
individuals for whom Pt−a,b = 1 (everyone goes to college) and Pt−a,b = 0 (nobody goes to college),
allowing us to compute college and high school wages free from selection.
Before we present any of our decompositions it is important to comment on the ﬁt of the model.
If the ﬁt is poor, then this exercise would not be as interesting. In the online appendix, we show
that the reduced-form model ﬁts almost perfectly the evolution of the college premium from 1960
to 2000, as well as the evolution of the college and high school age premia.31
Figure 4 shows trends in quality-adjusted and unadjusted college and age premia using the
estimation results reported in column (1) of Table 1 (corresponding to the robust reduced form
model). In the top-left panel of the ﬁgure, the solid line correspond to CPt in (17), while the
dashed lines correspond to CP
Q
t in (20). This panel shows that the college premium increased by
20% between 1960 and 2000, but the quality adjusted college premium increased by 26%.32 There
is a substantial diﬀerence of 6 percentage points shown in the top-right panel (the solid line plots
the diﬀerence between the two lines in the previous panel), which is due to the large increase in
college enrollment during this period, also shown in the top-right panel (dashed line). The largest
31The ﬁt of the college age premia is relatively poor for 1960s and 1970s. Thus, when we compare the quality-
adjusted and unadjusted college age premia, we focus on the period of 1980-2000.
32In the ﬁgure, the lines are based on ﬁtted values from the reduced-form model, i.e. column (1) of Table 1.
29decline in quality from 1970 to 1980 corresponds to the largest increase in college enrollment in
the same period and relatively modest decreases in quality in both 1980-1990 and 1990-2000 are
associated with a slowdown in the growth in college attainment in those periods.
The three bottom-left panels show a dramatic diﬀerence between adjusted and unadjusted
trends in the age premium in the college sector. For example, if we look at the unadjusted trends
from 1980 to 1990, then there is a large decrease of about 10% in the age premium between age
groups 25-30 and 36-40. On the other hand, the quality-adjusted trends show a decrease of only
4%. This suggests that from 1980 to 1990, the quality of college workers in age group 36-40 declined
substantially relative to that of those in age group 25-30. Interestingly, if we look at changes from
1990 to 2000, there is a larger increase in the unadjusted age premium than in the quality-adjusted
age premium. This implies that from 1990 to 2000, the quality of college workers in age group
36-40 increased substantially relative to that of those in age group 25-30. If we look at the age
premia of age groups 46-50 and 56-60 relative to the age group 25-30, then there is a decrease in the
unadjusted age premia from 1980 to 1990. However, there is an increase in the quality-adjusted age
premia for the same period. The three bottom-right panels show that there is virtually no quality
change over time in the age premium in the high school sector. This is because composition plays
little role (if any at all) in explaining high school wages.
What remains to be shown is the set of changes in supply and composition across age groups
that drive the results we just discussed. Figure 5 shows us the main drivers of composition and
supply eﬀects in the age premium. The three left panels of the ﬁgure show the evolution of the
proportion in college over time for old and young workers, as well as their relative proportion over
time (rescaled to ﬁt the ﬁgure). The decrease and increase of the relative proportion in college
coincides with our interpretation that the quality of old college workers (age group 36-40) decreased
relatively (with respect to young college workers, age group 25-30) from 1980 to 1990 and increased
relatively from 1990 to 2000. In addition, the largest increase of the relative proportion in college
for age groups 46-50 and 56-60 (that is, the largest quality decline for those age groups) coincides
with the reversal of trends (decreasing trends in the unadjusted premia vs. increasing trends in
the adjusted premia) from 1980 to 1990. It is also clear from the ﬁgure that changes in quality
cannot possibly explain ﬂuctuations in the age premium in high school. The three right panels
of the ﬁgure show the labor supply of old workers relative to young workers for both college and
high school (measured in log weeks worked in each year). It appears that changes in relative labor
30supply do not mimic the changes in age premia, especially in the college age premium (age premia
are shown in Figure 4). This suggests that changes in demand play an important role explaining
trends in age premia as well, just like the college premium.
We now move to our estimates of relative demands for college workers and older workers after
adjusting for quality. The trend in the relative demand for college skill is given by log(θCtr/θHtr).
It is well known that, without additional assumptions, one cannot identify this trend separately
from ρ (see equations (11) and (12)).33 Therefore, one alternative is to take an estimate of ρ from
the literature, and compute the implied series for log(θCtr/θHtr). Card and Lemieux (2001) who,
like us, use a sample of males only, estimate ρ to be close to 0.673 (table IV, column 3, shows that
1 − ρ = 0.327). This is the number we take for our calculations. Given ρ, we compute the implied
series for log(θCtr/θHtr).34
In order to get the trend in the relative demand for older workers we just need to estimate
the changes in log(βat)|a=old − log(βat)|a=young, where βat is given in (11). In general, this can be
derived from the series of ξkat from equation (13), but in our paper we just assumed this trend
to be linear. The identifying assumption is that the trend in the demand for older workers does
not vary across regions. If it did, we would have the same identiﬁcation problem as above, and we
would not be able to distinguish this trend from ηk.
We could have used a diﬀerent speciﬁcation, but we believe that the choices we made are
adequate. First, since there are already several estimates of ρ in the literature and we have nothing
to add to its estimation, the most natural way to proceed is to use one of them in our calculations
(although it is possible that quality adjustments, absent from the literature so far, aﬀect the
estimate of ρ).35 Second, there is hardly any discussion in the literature about the trend in the
demand for older workers, and therefore we wanted to be as simple as possible in our speciﬁcation
without compromising the estimation of ηk. Our assumption produces estimates of ηk that are
similar to other estimates in the literature, giving us conﬁdence in our procedure.
33If suitable identifying assumptions are placed on demand growth then the parameter ρ can be estimated in a
second-stage procedure with estimates of ηk, βat, αka, Φk, and φk as inputs to the second-stage estimation.











using parameter estimates. Since we
include a general trend in the model, it is only possible to identify βat relative to this general trend. Therefore, we
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k

















atrb) over (a,b), weighted by the cell sizes.
35We are grateful to David Autor for suggesting this.
31Table 9 shows demand estimates for college using the estimation results reported in columns
(2) and (3) of Table 1. In particular, it shows percentage changes in the relative demands for
all regions as well as four large Census regions. First of all, the trend in demand is shown to be
qualitatively the same regardless of the quality-adjustment: it increases in the 1960s, slows down
in the 1970s, accelerates in the 1980s, slows down again the 1990s. Estimated trends are also quite
similar across the four large regions. Controlling for the quality of college workers is quantitatively
important. The quality adjusted trend in the demand for college workers (a measure of skill biased
technological progress) is 10 percentage points higher than the unadjusted trend. This magnitude
is comparable to 6 percentage points diﬀerence in the college premium, as reported in Figure 4.
Regional demand estimates show that adjusted trends are higher than unadjusted trends for each
region, although they are quite diﬀerent quantitatively.
Table 10 shows relative demand estimates for old workers using the estimation results reported
in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1. As in Table 9, it shows percentage changes in the relative demands
for the youngest worker group (25-30) and two old worker groups (46-50, 56-60) with respect to
the workers of prime age (36-40).36 Recall that we used the linear time trend speciﬁcation of
log(βat), thereby resulting in identical changes in the relative demand for older workers for each
decade. The most striking results are (1) the relative demands for prime age workers relatively to
the youngest workers increased substantially from 1970 to 2000, (2) the demand for older workers
increased relatively to prime age workers, and (3) the quality adjustment plays a relative minor
role (as opposed to the previous table).
8 Can Declining Quality of Old Workers Explain the Rising Col-
lege Premium for Young Workers?
In this section, using the estimation results reported in Section 4, we revisit the analysis of
Card and Lemieux (2001), who explain the rising college premium for young workers (but not
for old workers) by a fall in the supply of young college workers relative to old workers. In contrast,
we show in this section that changes in quality are important factors to explain the phenomenon
they document.
Table 11 summarizes our analysis. In column (1) we show changes from 1980 to 1990 in the
36Originally we were using the younger group as base, but a referee rightly pointed out to us that a much clearer
picture emerged if we used prime-age workers as the reference group in the table.
32raw college premium (data), composition-ﬁxed (or quality-ﬁxed) college premium, and propor-
tion in college for the two age groups considered in Card and Lemieux (2001). In this table, the
composition-ﬁxed college premium is constructed using the reduced-form model (i.e. column (1) of
Table 1). The diﬀerence in the growth of the raw college premium between those aged 25-60 and
those aged 45 - 60 is 9.5%, which Card and Lemieux (2001) attribute to a falling relative supply
of young college workers. An interesting thought experiment is the following: what would be this
diﬀerence if the quality of both age groups of workers were ﬁxed? According to our estimates, the
diﬀerence would be just 6%. That is, about 37% of observed increase in the college premium for
young workers relatively to old workers can be attributed to the declining quality of old college
workers relative to young college workers. In column (2), we carry out the same analysis for changes
from 1990 to 2000. Unlike the previous decade, the change in the college premium is small and
therefore quality adjustment is less important in this decade.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we make the following points.37 First, increases in college attainment cause adverse
compositional shifts that mask the rising college demand during the 1990s. Composition shifts
aﬀect average college wages, but not average high school wages. As a result, the composition-
adjusted college premium rose by 26% over 1960-2000 rather than 20% as OLS estimates suggest.
Second, these compositional shifts also lead to overestimates of the eﬀect of supply on the change in
the college premium in the same interval, since more than a third of changes in the college premium
for young workers from 1980 to 1990 are due to favorable compositional shifts rather than changes
in the position of the relative supply curve. Third, compositional shifts also change our estimates
of the trend in the demand for college graduates. Fourth, this paper uncovers a rising trend in
the demand for older relatively to younger workers. Fifth, this paper cannot assess whether the
adverse eﬀect of composition on the college premium is due to a reduction in quality at the margin
or a reduction in quality on average (say, due to college crowding). The distinction is important for
policy since the latter is readily remediable with additional college resources whereas the former
may be much harder to address. Distinguishing these hypotheses is a critical direction for future
research.
37This set of conclusions is taken, almost ipsis verbis, from the report of an incredibly generous and thoughtful
referee.
33A Appendix: Estimation of the Structural Model
This appendix describes our method for estimating the structural model. In order to estimate an
equation based on (13) we need to specify a model for lnQk













i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1
￿
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i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1
￿
in a general way we would make it a
ﬂexible function of Pt−a,b and (Pk
M,atrb,Pk
M,atrr), for all b and r. The problem with this approach is
one of potential multicollinearity, since all these variables appear elsewhere in the regression (in the
term deﬁned by equation (4)). In this appendix we explore alternative methods for constructing
Qk
atr.
One possibility is to model lnQk
atr directly using a reduced-form speciﬁcation, and restrict the
way Pt−a,b, Pk
M,atrb, and Pk
M,atrr enter the estimating equation. To break the collinearity problem
mentioned above, we restrict all Pt−a,b and Pk
M,atrb to inﬂuence lnQk









































5) are unknown parameters for each schooling group k. The idea behind (21) is
again similar to those in (4) and (25): the aggregate quality of average workers in a regional labor
market can diﬀer because of aggregate composition of workers e Patr and selective migration Pk
M,atr.
We use this as our baseline speciﬁcation of lnQk
atr and we report baseline estimation results in
column (2) of Table 1.
We now describe the exact speciﬁcations of columns (2) and (3) of Table 1. Note that ζk
4 and
ζk
5 cannot be separately identiﬁed from the terms in λk in (4), so we just absorb them in λk. When
estimating column (3), quality-unadjusted log weeks (logNk
atr) are used instead of the quality-
adjusted log weeks, and all the quality-related variables ( ˜ Pt−a,b, e Patr, and PM,atr) are excluded
from the regression.
The functional form used in (21) is arbitrary and is meant to approximate lnQk
atr in a parsimo-
nious way. The advantage of using a parsimonious speciﬁcation of lnQk
atr is simplicity, but its cost
is that it is restrictive and can be misspeciﬁed. The remaining models of lnQk
atr in this appendix
34will be used to check the robustness of our results to diﬀerent speciﬁcations for lnQk
atr.
One natural alternative to break the collinearity problem is based on the fact that when mod-
eling Qk
atr, the probabilities (Pt−a,b, Pk
M,atrb, and Pk
































































































3 ) : b = 1,...,R} are unknown parameters
we estimate. Column (2) of Table A-12 reports estimation results of the structural model with the
speciﬁcation of lnQk
atr in (22).
It is also possible to consider alternatives which are more consistent with the original model
we specify. For example, we can use the wage structure assumed in (1) to reduce the number of
variables (Pt−a,b) that we need to include in the regression. Notice that (1) implies that for any two
diﬀerent regions of birth, say b0 and b00, the relative quality across diﬀerent groups of individuals in























i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1
￿, (23)
since workers living in the same region face the same skill prices (Πk
atr is non-random conditional
on Sk
i = 1,Aita = 1,Mitrb = 1). Notice that the left-hand side of (23) is unobservable, but the
right-hand side is observable from the data. Then, re-write (9) as
Qk


































In words, we normalize Qk
atr by the quality of the group of workers who were born in region r, and
35we call this quantity ˜ Qk
























































which can be estimated directly by sample analogs using Census data. To complete the description
of Qk














where Γk˜ b is region-of-birth ﬁxed eﬀects, Φk is a function of Pt−a,˜ b (composition), and Λk is a
function of Pk
M,atr˜ b and Pk
M,atrr (migration). The exponential function is used to ensure that the
conditional expectation on the left-hand side of (25) is always positive. We assume that Φk in (25)
is linear in the odds of proportion in college. It is not necessary to specify the term Λk separately
because when b = r, Λk is only a function of Pk
M,atrr and can be absorbed into λk in (4). The
underlying ideas behind (25) are the same as in (4): the average quality of workers can diﬀer
because of region-of-birth ﬁxed eﬀects, diﬀerences in composition captured by Pt−a,b, and selective
migration.38
One problem with this approach is that Qk
atr is modeled as a function of ratios of the dependent
variable, which can cause an endogeneity problem if the model is misspeciﬁed. We tackle this












(for each census, the lag can
be constructed using the previous census, 10 years before) and using them as instruments. Column
(3) of Table A-12 reports ordinary-least-squares estimation results of the structural model with the
third speciﬁcation of Qk
atr and column (4) reports instrumental-variables estimation results. Again,
these alternative estimation results are quite similar to baseline results, which are reproduced in
column (1) of Table A-12. It is assuring that all of alternative estimation results are in line with
the baseline results. We conclude that our main results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of
Qk
atr.
38Notice that Γkb and Λk are diﬀerent from γkab, γktb, and λk. Strictly speaking, (25) is not directly compatible
to (4) since in general, E[log Y |X] ≤ logE[Y |X] for random variables Y and X (Jensen’s inequality).
36B Appendix: Data and Additional Empirical Results
B.1 Data
We use data from the 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Censuses (1% sample). Our data was
extracted from http://www.ipums.umn.edu/ (see Ruggles et al., 2004). We focus on white males,
between the ages 25 and 60. We exclude from the analysis all those who are foreign born. We
consider 5 year age groups (with the exception of the ﬁrst, which has 6 years): 25-30, 31-35, 36-40,
41-45, 46-50, 51-55.
For 1960, 1970 and 1980, the education variable we use is “highest grade of schooling”, while for
1990 and 2000 we use “educational attainment recode”. We group individuals into four categories:
high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, college graduate or more. For 1960,
1970 and 1980, we consider high school dropouts those who have completed less than 12 years of
schooling, high school graduates are those with exactly 12 years of completed schooling, college
graduates have completed 4 or more years of college, and some college is the category for those with
more than 12 but less than 16 years of schooling. For 1990 and 2000, dropouts are those with up
to 11 years of schooling, high school graduates have exactly 12 years of schooling, those with some
college have 1 to 3 years of college, and college graduates have four or more years of college. Our
ﬁnal classiﬁcation has two groups only, one comprising of high school graduates and high school
dropouts, and the other comprising of those with some college, a college degree, or above.
We compute weekly wages by dividing annual wage and salary income by annual weeks worked.
We deﬂate all wages to 1990 values using the CPI-U from the Economic Report of the President.
In order to compute average log wages for each year-age group-region of residence-region of birth
cell (the main outcome variable in our analysis) we drop all observations for whom real wages are
below 50 dollars per week.
For each year, region of birth and ﬁve year cohort we also estimate the proportion of individuals
who attend at least some college. However, even among adults, educational attainment increases
over time. Therefore we calculate an average proportion of individuals who attend at least some
college for each cohort and region of birth (common across years), by averaging this number across
all years, using as weights the number of individuals in each year, cohort and region of birth cell.
We consider 9 regions of birth and 9 regions of residence, and we drop from the sample those
individuals who are foreign born. In particular, we use the regions deﬁned by the Census: New
37England (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont), Middle
Atlantic (New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania), East North Central (Illinois, Indiana, Michi-
gan, Ohio, Wisconsin), West North Central (Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota), South Atlantic (Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Mary-
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia), East South Central (Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee), West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas),
Mountain (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming), Paciﬁc
(Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington).
We group individuals into cells deﬁned by ﬁve variables: schooling (high school or college),
year, age group, region of residence, and region of birth. The reason we do not use the state as the
regional unit is that the resulting cell sizes would be too small for our estimates to be reliable.
For each cell we compute the relevant average weekly log wages for full-time/full-year workers,
log total weeks worked (a measure of labor supply) and the proportion of individuals in college (a
measure of composition). Full-time/full-year workers are individuals who work at least 35 hours a
week and 40 weeks a year. In order to construct hours worked per week we use usual hours worked
in a week for the year of 1980, 1990 and 2000, and hours worked the week before the interview
for 1960 and 1970. We exclude farm workers from the group of full-time/full year workers. The
construction of wages and weeks worked described in this section is based on Card and Lemieux
(2001). Weekly wages for high school graduates are obtained by taking only males with exactly
12 years of schooling and dividing annual income from wages by annual weeks worked. Weekly
wages for college graduates are obtained in an analogous way, but considering only individuals with
exactly 16 years of schooling. Unfortunately, for the 1960 and 1970 US Censuses weeks worked are
only available in intervals: 1 to 13, 24 to 26, 27 to 39, 40 to 47, 48 to 49, 50 to 52. For these two
years we take the midpoint of each interval as our estimate of weeks worked.
Log weeks worked by high school graduates (or high school equivalents) are a weighted sum of
weeks worked by white males in each region of residence, who can be high school dropouts, high
school graduates, and even individuals with some college. Log weeks worked by college graduates
are a weighted sum of weeks worked by white males with some college, a college degree, or post-
graduate studies.
The weights for these sums are deﬁned as follows. Each high school dropout week is only a
fraction of a regular high school graduate week. This fraction corresponds to the relative wage
38of high school dropouts and high school graduates. Similarly, each week worked by an individual
with a post-graduate degree has a larger weight than a week worked by a college graduate, and
the weight is given by the relative wage of post-graduates and college graduates. Finally, in order
to construct the weights for some college weeks, we ﬁrst look at the diﬀerence between high school
graduate and college graduate wages. If the diﬀerence between some college wages and high school
graduate wages is say, one third of the diﬀerence between college and high school wages, then we
assign one third of some college weeks to high school, and two thirds to college. We allow these
weights to vary across age groups, but not across year or region.
B.2 Average and Marginal Students
Table A-13 in the appendix simulates the eﬀects of declining quality of marginal college graduates
on their average log wages for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the model, and at diﬀerent levels of P. We
consider a simple economy that consists of only two schooling groups: high school graduates and
college graduates. Let w1 be the average log wage of the baseline college graduates and w2 be the
average log wage of the marginal college graduates. Note that the average log wage after college
expansion, say w∗, has the form:
w∗ = (1 − µ) × w1 + µ × w2, (26)
where µ is the proportion of marginal college graduates after college expansion. Since our model
is linear in the odds of college enrollment (Pt−a,b/(1 − Pt−a,b)), in view of the estimation result in
column (1) of Table 1 in the main text, we have
w∗ = w1 − 0.086 × (changes in Pt−a,b/(1 − Pt−a,b)). (27)
Thus, combining (26) and (27) and solving for w2 gives
w2 = w1 − 0.086 × µ−1 × (changes in Pt−a,b/(1 − Pt−a,b)).
The column (4) of Panel A of Table A-13 shows the eﬀects of absolute increases of 10% in college
enrollment across diﬀerent baseline college enrollment rates and the same column of Panel B shows
those of proportional increases of 10% in college enrollment. For example, if the baseline college
39enrollment rate is 40%, then an absolute increases of 10% in college enrollment leads to a decrease
of 14% in marginal college wages, thereby implying that the quality of the average marginal college
graduate is 14% lower than that of the average baseline college graduate. It can be seen that
marginal college graduates are always of lower quality than baseline college graduates, but the
magnitude of the decrease in quality is larger when there is a higher proportion of baseline college
graduates. In other words, as college expands, it would induce lower and lower quality college
graduates. Our main qualitative results do not change when an alternative model speciﬁcation is
used. column (5) of Table A-13 reports that the main results are the same when the model is linear
in the level of college enrollment (Pt−a,b).39
Notice that changes in worker quality resulting from increases in college participation do not
necessarily have to lead to decreases in the college premium. Theoretically, the adjustment in the
college premium could go either way, depending on how individuals sort into diﬀerent levels of
schooling, and on how important heterogeneity is in high school and college (see Carneiro and Lee,
2009). Our results indicate that: i) skill heterogeneity and self selection into schooling are important
phenomena, so that if college enrollment went from 40% to 50%, the average marginal student’s
quality would be 14% lower than that of the average student in college; ii) those individuals with
the highest college skills select into college; iii) there is no clear relationship between the type of
skills used in high school occupations and selection into college.
B.3 Additional Speciﬁcation Checks
In this section we present additional speciﬁcation checks. In Table A-14 we examine how results
change when we drop one of the nine regions at a time from the sample, to check whether results
are driven by one region alone as opposed to being a national phenomenon. The table has 10
columns. The ﬁrst one corresponds to our original speciﬁcation, where all regions are included,
and in the remaining ones we drop from the sample one region at a time. Across columns, the
coeﬃcient of interest in the college equation is always negative and statistically signiﬁcant, while
in the high school equation the coeﬃcient is small and insigniﬁcant.
In Table A-15 we examine the sensitivity of our results to dropping one year at a time.40 In the
39In this case, the corresponding coeﬃcient for Pt−a,b is −0.517, implying that
w2 = w1 − 0.517 × µ
−1 × (changes in P).
40If we estimate the model decade by decade the coeﬃcient on variable of interest is always negative but not
40ﬁrst column of the table we present the original speciﬁcation, while in the remaining ﬁve columns
we drop from the sample one year at a time. Across columns there are relatively small changes in
the coeﬃcient of interest, both in the college and in the high school equation.
Second, since we aggregate individuals into two levels of schooling only, one may worry that
changes in college attainment also lead to changes in composition within each of these aggregates
(between dropouts and high school graduates, those with some college and college graduates, or
those between college graduates and post-college-educated workers). This is likely to be the case,
but it does not seem to aﬀect our results. Table A-16 shows that the main results are basically
unchanged once we include measures of within group composition (the within odds of proportion
in dropout, the within odds of proportion in some college, and the within odds of proportion in
post college enrollment).
Table A-17 presents estimation results for the high school wage equation with alternative spec-
iﬁcations and samples. Basically, there is no composition eﬀect for high school graduates across
diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Figure A-6 shows estimated functional forms of φk with alternative speciﬁcations in the reduced-
form model for k = C,H. The top panels of the ﬁgure show alternative speciﬁcations of φC for
log college wages in the reduced-form model. In particular, the alternative forms of φC are as
follows: linear in P/(1 − P), P, logP/(1 − P), or φ(Φ−1(P))/P (the inverse Mills ratio based
on the normality assumption) [top-left panel] and also linear and quadratic in P/(1 − P) and P
[top-right panel], where P is the birth-cohort/region-of-birth speciﬁc college enrollment rates. The
bottom panels show alternative speciﬁcations of φH for log high-school wages in the reduced-form
model. The alternative forms of φH are the same as the college equation except that the inverse
Mills ratio for high school is now φ(Φ−1(P))/(1 − P). In the college equation, all the p-values for
the hypothesis that φC is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero are less than or equal to 0.06, except for
the cases of an inverse Mills ratio (p-value: 0.39) and the log of odds (p-value: 0.12). In the high
school equation, the smallest and largest p-values across all speciﬁcations are 0.10 and 0.26.
The ﬁt of the reduced form model is presented in Figure A-7. The ﬁgure compares data with
the ﬁt of model based on column (1) of Table 1 in the main text. The top panel shows the ﬁt of
the college premium and the three left-side panels and the three right-hand side panels show the
ﬁt of the college age premia and the high school age premia, respectively. Overall, the ﬁt of the
statistically signiﬁcant.
41model is very good, especially for 1980-2000.
B.4 Additional Direct Evidence on Declining Quality of College Workers
In this section we provide additional direct evidence on declining quality of college workers by ana-
lyzing data from the original cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Males (NLS66),
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979 (NLSY79), and the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youth of 1997 (NLSY97). For simplicity, we present results comparing only North and South,
but we have available results for ﬁner regional partitions which show similar patterns. We take
white males, and we divide them in two groups: those growing up in the southern regions of the
US, and those growing up elsewhere. For each individual in each region we compute his percentile
in the distribution of test scores within region (the AFQT in the NLSY79 and NLSY97, and IQ in
NLS66).41 Finally, we divide the sample into those with some college or more, and those with less
than college, and calculate the average percentile in the test score distribution for each education
group and region. The question we ask is: in regions where college participation is higher is the
average college student in a lower percentile of the within-region test score distribution?
Results are shown in table A-18. The number in each cell in columns (1) and (2) corresponds
to the average percentile in the within-region test score distribution for each dataset, region and
schooling group. Columns (3) and (4) show the proportion of individuals in each sample with at
least some college, and the corresponding odds. For example, in the NLSY79 the college participa-
tion rate is 56% in the North and 48% in the South, and the average percentile of college student in
the within-region test score distribution is 64% in the North and 69% in the South. Therefore, in
the North, where the levels of college attendance are higher, the average college student has lower
quality (relatively to the other residents in the region) than in the South, where levels of college
attendance are lower. This is also true in NLS66 and NLSY97. Notice that percentiles of the test
score distribution are taken within region, not across regions, because there could be systematic
diﬀerences in test scores across regions which we want to abstract from. The question we ask is
whether, in regions with high college participation, college students have lower ability relatively to
other residents in the region than in regions with low college participation.
One could ask whether the magnitude of these test score diﬀerences is enough to explain the
wage diﬀerences we observe in the Census. If we regress log hourly wages in 1994 on within
41We use schooling corrected AFQT in the NLSY79, as in Carneiro et al. (2009).
42region AFQT percentile for white males in the NLSY79 with some college and residing in the
North we get a coeﬃcient of about 0.5 (and essentially the same coeﬃcient, 0.6, if we use those
in the South instead). This magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient translates to an increase of
about 14.4% (= 0.5 × 28.8%, where 28.8% is the standard deviation of within region percentile
test scores) in hourly wages with respect to the one standard deviation increase in the AFQT
percentile. This estimate is within the range of previous estimates for the return to the test scores.
For example, Bishop (1989) ﬁnds that a one standard deviation increase in test score is associated
with a 19% increase in earnings for male household heads using data from the 1971 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (see equation (3) of Bishop, 1989); Neal and Johnson (1996) report an estimate
of about 17% increase (see Column 3 of Table 1 of Neal and Johnson, 1996); Murnane et al. (1995)
obtain an estimate of about 8% increase with respect to the one standard deviation increase in the
mathematics score using data from High School and Beyond (see tables 2 and 3 Murnane et al.,
1995). Our estimation result from NLSY79 means that the diﬀerence of 5 percentile points between
those college participants residing in the South and those residing elsewhere, corresponds to a
diﬀerence in wages of 2.5 percentage points (= 0.5 × 5%) if we use the estimate from the North
(3 percentage points, respectively, if we use the estimate from the South). Given that the college
participation rates are 48% in the South and 56% elsewhere, if we were to use our estimates of
the reduced-form equation, we would expect college wages to be about 3 percentile points higher
in the south than elsewhere (0.086 × a diﬀerence of 0.35 in the odds of P). These magnitudes are
reassuringly similar to each other. This provides suggestive and direct evidence that increases in
college attainment lead to declines in the quality of college attendees.




(Controlling for (Controlling for (Without Controlling
Quality) Quality) for Quality)
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.086 -0.092
[0.036]** [0.032]***




Observations 2598 2598 2598
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.032 -0.023
[0.022] [0.024]








(Year)×(Region of Residence)×(Region of Birth)
√ √ √













2 √ √ √
(Observed Migr. Prob.)×(Staying Prob.)
√ √ √
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. The variable “Odds of Proportion in College” is
the odds of going to college for cohort t − a born in region b. The variable “Quality-Adjusted Log Weeks” is the
logarithm of the labor supply multiplied by the average quality. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the
sampling variance of average log wages in each cell. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of
residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.




atrb as supply Drop Pt−a,b
for and Pt−a,b as from
Quality composition column (1)
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.092
[0.032]***
Proportion in College (Pt−a,b) -0.097
[0.014]***






Observations 2598 2598 2598
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.023
[0.024]
Proportion in College (Pt−a,b) -0.004
[0.007]






Observations 2692 2692 2692
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. The variable “Odds of Proportion in College” is the
odds of going to college for cohort t−a born in region b. The variable “Quality-Adjusted Log Weeks” is the logarithm
of the labor supply multiplied by the average quality. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the sampling
variance of average log wages in each cell. Included explanatory variables are the same as in Table 1. Robust standard
errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%;
*** signiﬁcant at 1%.
45Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Speciﬁcations and Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The Dependent Variable: Log College Wages
White Males (Original Sample)
Odds of Proportion in College -0.086 -0.106
[0.036]** [0.087]
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 0.005
[0.021]





Observations 2598 2598 2598 2598
P-value 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04
White Females
Odds of Proportion in College -0.028 -0.006
[0.036] [0.112]
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 -0.005
[0.022]





Observations 2097 2097 2097 2097
P-value 0.44 0.62 0.84 0.57
Both White Males and Females
Odds of Proportion in College -0.06 -0.189
[0.040] [0.101]*
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 0.034
[0.025]





Observations 2662 2662 2662 2662
P-value 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.12
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
46Table 4: Estimation Results of Sensitivity Analysis (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.093 -0.086 -0.086 -0.096 -0.086 -0.086 -0.080
[0.038]** [0.049]* [0.032]** [0.041]** [0.036]** [0.055] [0.043]*
Observations 2598 2598 2598 2598 2598 2283 2517
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.014 0.032 -0.029 -0.019 -0.032 -0.038 0.000
[0.028] [0.034] [0.022] [0.028] [0.022] [0.030] [0.031]
Observations 2692 2692 2692 2692 2692 2377 2611
Included Explanatory Variables
(Year)×(Age)×(Region of Residence)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
(Age)×(Region of Birth)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
(Year)×(Region of Birth)




(Year)×(R. of Res.)×(R. of Birth)
√ √
Basic Migration Probabilities





Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance of average log wages in each cell.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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7Table 5: Diﬀerences between Inclusion and Exclusion of Migration Probabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log College Wages Log High School Wages
Odds of Proportion in College -0.086 -0.093 -0.032 -0.014
[0.036]** [0.038]** [0.022] [0.028]
Staying Probability 0.004 -0.042 -0.164 -0.149
[0.910] [0.917] [0.580] [0.585]
(Staying Prob.)
2 -0.305 -0.269 -0.082 -0.068
[0.705] [0.710] [0.424] [0.435]
Observed Migration Probability -0.451 -0.538 -0.023 -0.049
[0.322] [0.331] [0.264] [0.273]
(Observed Migr. Prob.)
2 0.517 0.393 -0.709 -0.738
[0.535] [0.550] [0.367]* [0.383]*
(Observed Migr. Prob.) 0.379 0.580 1.047 1.095
×(Staying Prob.) [0.644] [0.648] [0.299]*** [0.311]***
Observations 2598 2598 2598 2692 2692 2692
Included Explanatory Variables
(Year)×(Age)×(Region of Residence)
√ √ √ √ √ √
(Year)×(Region of Birth)
√ √ √ √ √ √
(Age)×(Region of Birth)
√ √ √ √ √ √
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the
sampling variance of average log wages in each cell. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of
residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
48Table 6: Relationship between Proportion in College and Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Staying Observed Migration Migration Premium
Probability Probability
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College 0.01 -0.011 0.001 0.000 -0.022 -0.006 -0.006
[0.016] [0.015] [0.001] [0.002] [0.052] [0.032] [0.033]
Observations 310 310 2430 2430 2283 2283 2283
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College 0.034 -0.027 -0.005 0.002 -0.235 -0.005 -0.008
[0.013]*** [0.014]* [0.002]*** [0.003] [0.049]*** [0.031] [0.032]







√ √ √ √
(Age)×(Region of Birth)
√ √ √ √
Basic Migration Probabilities
√
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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9Table 7: Regression of SAT Scores on the Percentage of High School Graduates Taking SAT, with
Year and State Dummies - 1993/2004 (except 1995 and 1998)
(1) (2)
SAT Math SAT Verbal
Percentage of High School -16.503 -26.268








Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 8: Regression of Quantitative Literacy on Proportion in College
(1) (2) (3)
Variable College High School All




Age 0.101 0.001 0.037
[0.024]*** [0.019] [0.013]***
Age Squared -0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.000]*** [0.000] [0.000]***
Constant -0.794 -0.651 -1.050
[0.416]* [0.444] [0.295]***
Observations 962 1503 2465
R-squared 0.03 0.00 0.22
Notes: The dependent variable is the standardized quantitative literacy score of individuals aged 25-60 in the US
sample of the International Adult Literacy Survey. Proportion in college is the percentage of individuals with some
college or more and is computed for each cohort. The variable “College” is a dummy variable for individuals with
some college or more. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the cohort level. * signiﬁcant at 10%; **
signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
50Table 9: Changes in the Relative Demands for College Graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relative Demand 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 1960-2000
All Regions Quality-Adjusted 17.83 11.10 23.95 13.01 65.89
Unadjusted 16.22 6.38 21.93 11.31 55.84
Northeast Quality-Adjusted 16.70 8.85 25.39 16.27 67.21
Unadjusted 14.04 2.84 22.47 13.02 52.37
Midwest Quality-Adjusted 16.70 9.78 24.49 13.33 64.30
Unadjusted 14.70 3.37 21.25 10.73 50.05
South Quality-Adjusted 20.52 11.64 21.37 11.99 65.52
Unadjusted 17.97 9.12 20.48 11.06 58.63
West Quality-Adjusted 19.91 14.26 22.66 12.41 69.24
Unadjusted 21.24 9.07 21.05 11.57 62.93
Notes: The reported numbers are one hundred times the changes in weighted averages of estimates of log(θCtr/θHtr),
where θktr is a factor-augmenting technology eﬃciency parameter for schooling group k in time period t in region r
and is given in (11) in the main text. The weights are based on proportions of the sample for each cell.
Table 10: Changes in the Relative Demands for Older Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age Group Relative Demand 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 1960-2000
25-30 vs. Quality-Adjusted -2.47 -12.33
36-40 Unadjusted -2.69 -13.43
46-50 vs. Quality-Adjusted 1.47 7.35
36-40 Unadjusted 1.52 7.58
56-60 vs. Quality-Adjusted 3.01 15.05
36-40 Unadjusted 3.23 16.16
Notes: The reported numbers are one hundred times the changes in estimates of log(βat)|a=old − log(βat)|a=young,
where βat is a factor-augmenting technology eﬃciency parameter for age group a in time period t and is given in (11)
in the main text. The changes are identical over decades because of the linear time trend speciﬁcation of log(βat).
51Table 11: Changes in the College Premium between Young and Old Workers
(1) (2)
Changes from 1980 to 1990 Changes from 1990 to 2000
Age Group: 25 - 30
Raw College Premium 0.179 0.041
Composition-Fixed College Premium 0.165 0.061
Proportion in College -0.041 0.058
Age Group: 45 - 60
Raw College Premium 0.084 0.014
Composition-Fixed College Premium 0.105 0.051
Proportion in College 0.115 0.139
Diﬀerences between Two Age Groups
Raw College Premium 0.095 0.027
Composition-Fixed College Premium 0.060 0.010
Notes: The ﬁrst column of the table shows changes from 1980 to 1990 in the raw college premium (data), in
composition-ﬁxed (or quality-ﬁxed) college premium, and in proportion in college for two age groups: 25-30 and
45-60. The second column shows changes from 1990 to 2000.
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Notes: Using US Census data between 1960 and 2000, the ﬁgure graphs the college premium in
each (year)×(age)×(region of birth)×(region of residence) cell against the proportion in college
by cohort and region of birth, after grouping individuals into three sets of regional labor markets:
those with a high share of college educated workers (30-40%), those with a medium share (20-30%),
and those with a low share (10-20%).



























































Regional Trends in the Proportion Going to College
Notes: This ﬁgure shows regional trends in skill premia and changes in the proportion of going to
college.
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Percentage of High School Graduates taking the SAT
SAT−Math SAT−Verbal
Notes: The ﬁgure displays average verbal and math SAT scores by state (in 2004) against the
percentage of high school graduates who take the SAT in each state.
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High School Age Premium − Ages 25−30 vs. 56−60
Notes: This ﬁgure shows quality-adjusted and unadjusted college and age premia.
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College High School
Relative Log Weeks − Ages 25−30 vs. 56−60
Notes: The top left panel of the ﬁgure shows changes in proportion in college and their relative
ratio for age groups 25-30 and 36-40. The middle and bottom left panels, respectively, show
corresponding lines for older age groups 46-50 and 56-60 along with the baseline young age group,
25-30. The three ﬁgures on the right panel of the ﬁgure show the labor supply of old workers
relative to young workers for both college and high school, measured in log weeks worked in each
year.
57Table A-12: Alternative Estimates of the Structural Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Interacting Using the Wage Using the Lagged
(Aggregate ˜ Patr) Pt−a,b with N
k
atrb Ratios Wage Ratios
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS IV
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.092 -0.099 -0.100 -0.093
[0.032]*** [0.035]*** [0.024]*** [-0.023]***
Quality-Adjusted Log Weeks -0.110 -0.130 -0.110 -0.155
[0.022]*** [0.020]*** [0.021]*** [0.019]***
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.023 -0.030 -0.034 -0.029
[0.024] [0.022] [0.024] [0.021]
Quality-Adjusted Log Weeks -0.091 -0.084 -0.090 -0.125
[0.012]*** [0.015]*** [0.011]*** [0.013]***
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. The variable “Odds of Proportion in College” is the
odds of going to college for cohort t−a born in region b. The variable “Quality-Adjusted Log Weeks” is the logarithm
of the labor supply multiplied by the average quality. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the sampling
variance of average log wages in each cell. Included explanatory variables are the same as in Table 1. Robust standard
errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%;
*** signiﬁcant at 1%.
58Table A-13: Changes in the log wages of marginal college graduates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Changes in Proportion of Changes in Log Wages of
College Enrollment College Enrollment Marginal College Graduates Marginal College Graduates
Model Speciﬁcation Linear in P/(1 − P) Linear in P
Panel A - Absolute Increase of 10% in College Enrollment
0.10 0.10 0.50 -0.02 -0.10
0.20 0.10 0.33 -0.05 -0.16
0.30 0.10 0.25 -0.08 -0.21
0.40 0.10 0.20 -0.14 -0.26
0.50 0.10 0.17 -0.25 -0.30
0.60 0.10 0.14 -0.51 -0.37
Panel B - Proportional Increase of 10% in College Enrollment
0.10 0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.06
0.20 0.02 0.09 -0.03 -0.11
0.30 0.03 0.09 -0.06 -0.17
0.40 0.04 0.09 -0.11 -0.23
0.50 0.05 0.09 -0.21 -0.29
0.60 0.06 0.09 -0.42 -0.34
Notes: This table shows the eﬀects of declining quality of marginal college graduates on their average log wages.
Consider an economy that consists of only two schooling groups: high school graduates and college graduates. Let
w1 be the average log wage of the baseline college graduates and w2 be the average log wage of the marginal college
graduates. Note that the average log wage after college expansion, say w∗, has the form:
w∗ = (1 − column(3)) × w1 + column(3) × w2.
If the model is linear in the odds of college enrollment (P/(1 − P)), then w∗ = w1 −0.086 × (changes in P/(1 − P)).
Thus, solving for w2 gives w2 = w1 + column(4), where column(4) = −0.086 × (changes in P/(1 − P))/column(3).
If the model is linear in the level of college enrollment (P), then w∗ = w1 − 0.517 × (changes in P). Thus, w2 =
w1 + column(5), where column(5) = −0.517 × (changes in P)/column(3). Panel A of the table shows the eﬀects of
absolute increases of 10% in college enrollment and Panel B shows those of proportional increases of 10% in college
enrollment.
59Table A-14: Sensitivity Analysis: Dropping One Region at a Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Dropping the Following Region:
Regions New Middle East North West North South East South West South Mountain Paciﬁc
England Atlantic Central Central Atlantic Central Central
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.086 -0.085 -0.065 -0.093 -0.092 -0.091 -0.083 -0.089 -0.080 -0.102
[0.036]** [0.035]** [0.031]** [0.039]** [0.038]** [0.044]** [0.037]** [0.037]** [0.034]** [0.038]**
Observations 2598 2361 2294 2287 2325 2289 2337 2300 2305 2286
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.032 -0.034 -0.045 -0.034 -0.034 -0.025 -0.034 -0.032 -0.031 -0.039
[0.022] [0.022] [0.020]** [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.026]
Observations 2692 2441 2391 2379 2388 2381 2416 2384 2379 2377
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance of average log wages in each cell.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
6
0Table A-15: Sensitivity Analysis: Dropping One Year at a Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Dropping the Following Year:
Years 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.086 -0.087 -0.082 -0.051 -0.101 -0.116
[0.036]** [0.037]** [0.043]* [0.028]* [0.053]* [0.051]**
Observations 2598 2148 2099 2068 2043 2034
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.032 -0.026 -0.031 -0.037 -0.029 -0.037
[0.022] [0.022] [0.029] [0.020]* [0.020] [0.034]
Observations 2692 2203 2155 2140 2137 2133
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. All regressions are weighted by the inverse of the sampling variance of average log wages in each cell.
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
6
1Table A-16: Regression of Wages with Measures of Within Group Composition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Basic Add Within Group Composition
Panel A - College
Odds of Proportion in College -0.086 -0.086 -0.087 -0.087
[0.036]** [0.037]** [0.035]** [0.035]**
Within Odds of Proportion in Some College 0.016 0.008
[0.115] [0.106]
Within Odds of Proportion in Post-College Enrollment -0.078 -0.074
[0.221] [0.196]
Observations 2598 2598 2598 2598
Panel B - High School
Odds of Proportion in College -0.032 -0.021
[0.022] [0.022]
Within Odds of Proportion in Dropout -0.023
[0.011]*
Observations 2692 2692
Notes: The dependent variable is log weekly wage in each cell. The regression includes basic controls as in column (1)
of Table 1 in the main text. Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year
cell. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
62Table A-17: Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Speciﬁcations and Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The Dependent Variable: Log High School Wages
White Males (Original Sample)
Odds of Proportion in College -0.032 -0.125
[0.022] [0.067]*
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 0.024
[0.016]





Observations 2692 2692 2692 2692
P-value 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.16
White Females
Odds of Proportion in College -0.011 -0.009
[0.023] [0.061]
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 -0.001
[0.014]





Observations 2538 2538 2538 2538
P-value 0.63 0.88 0.43 0.73
Both White Males and Females
Odds of Proportion in College -0.027 -0.107
[0.016] [0.048]**
(Odds of Proportion in College)
2 0.023
[0.013]*





Observations 2754 2754 2754 2754
P-value 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.06
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered on the region of residence-schooling-year cell. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
63Table A-18: Average Ability of College Attendees and Proportion of Going to College
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Data: NLS66
Average Percentile Average Percentile Proportion Odds
(High School) (College) in College (P) in P
North 0.35 0.60 0.59 1.45
South 0.33 0.64 0.55 1.22
Diﬀerence 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.22
Data: NLSY79
Average Percentile Average Percentile Proportion Odds
(High School) (College) in College (P) in P
North 0.32 0.64 0.56 1.27
South 0.33 0.69 0.48 0.92
Diﬀerence -0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.35
Data: NLSY97
Average Percentile Average Percentile Proportion Odds
(High School) (College) in College (P) in P
North 0.36 0.64 0.51 1.04
South 0.37 0.66 0.46 0.86
Diﬀerence -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.17
Notes: Data are from the original cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Males (NLS66), the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1979 (NLSY79), and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1997 (NLSY97).
In each dataset, white males are divided into two groups: those growing up in the southern regions of the US, and
those growing up elsewhere. For each individual in each region, his percentile is computed in the distribution of
test scores within region (the AFQT in the NLSY79 and NLSY97, and IQ in NLS66). Then, the sample is divided
into those with some college or more, and those with less than college, and the average percentile in the test score
distribution is computed for each education group and region. Each number in columns (1) and (2) corresponds to
the average percentile in the within region test score distribution for each dataset, region and schooling group. For
each dataset and region columns, (3) and (4) show the proportion of individuals in the sample with at least some
college and its corresponding odds.
64Figure A-6: Alternative Speciﬁcations of φk in the Reduced-Form Model










































































































































Notes: The top panels of the ﬁgure show alternative speciﬁcations of φC for log college wages in the reduced-
form model. In particular, the alternative forms of φC are as follows: linear in P/(1 − P), P, logP/(1 − P), or
φ(Φ
−1(P))/P (the inverse Mills ratio based on the normality assumption) [top-left panel] and also linear and quadratic
in P/(1 − P) and P [top-right panel], where P is the birth-cohort/region-of-birth speciﬁc college enrollment rates.
The bottom panels show alternative speciﬁcations of φH for log high-school wages in the reduced-form model. The
alternative forms of φH are the same as the college equation except that the inverse Mills ratio for high school is now
φ(Φ
−1(P))/(1−P). In the college equation, all the p-values for the hypothesis that φC is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero are less than or equal to 0.06, except for the cases of an inverse Mills ratio (p-value: 0.39) and the log of odds
(p-value: 0.12). In the high school equation, the smallest and largest p-values across all speciﬁcations are 0.10 and
0.26.
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Fit of Age Premium − High School, Ages 25−30 vs. 56−60
Notes: This ﬁgure compares data with the ﬁt of model based on column (1) of Table 1 in the main
text. The top panel shows the ﬁt of the college premium and the three left-side panels and the
three right-hand side panels show the ﬁt of the college age premia and the high school age premia,
respectively.
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